Tag Archives: conceptualization and objective reality

The Ability to Conceptualize Must Precede Existence: Existence is an irrational metaphysical Primary

As described in the previous essay on this subject, object A must be defined in comparative terms with object B–or C, D, E, etc.. That is, in terms  that include what is not A.  And the presence of he who defines, that is, the observer, makes this fact self-evident. The observer can only know A from the frame of reference of himself. (Where Self is not a mathematical, but a metaphysical/ontological absolute. Not merely a reference, but the reference for all of what he calls Reality). Meaning, he must make the distinction as an observer between what he is and what he is not– that is, himself and, in this scenario, object A; he must make the distinction between the observed and the observer. And since the observer is required to provide the frame of reference for the definition and thus the Truth, Efficacy, and even morality of what is observed–again, in this example, object A–it is clear that A cannot exist in a vacuum of itself. The observer is required to define A in the first place, and thus declare that A, now defined as this or that, does, in fact, exist.  Which brings me to…

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The Utter Necessity of Existence as Simply a Function of Conceptualization:

Of course, observation is not merely observation, itself, but is, in all practical and efficacious fact, a function of conceptualization. For it would seem self-evident (though, paradoxically, this is not asserted, except when conceptualization is confused with consciousness, which is false) that absent the conceptuualization of what is observed it is impossible to define what is observed. And if what is observed has no definition then there is no rational grounds to claim that anything is actually observed at all; and thus that which is said to exist–when Existence is the metaphysical primary, and observation (empiricism) is the means of ascertaining reality–at root cannot possibly be named and thus it cannot possibly be known, and thus it cannot possibly be said to BE, period.  In which case, where Existence precedes Conceptualization, it must be asserted that nothing actually exists first; and the observer then observes this “nothing” and somehow defines it.  In other words, the observer is said to observe nothing (that which is nameless and utterly definition-less), which somehow exists, and then conceptualize it, after which it becomes something…that is, nothing, which exists, becomes something because of man’s conceptualizing power, and yet man has nothing to do with its existence, even though without him it cannot be known or stated what actually exists at all. Which thus undermines the argument that Existence exists prior to conceptualization, because existence absent that which is defined as having existence is not only irrelevant and irrational, but impossible. Infinite Existence as a Primary can neither be valued, nor does it imply the existence of things which can be valued. Only conceptualization can create things which are said to exist. It is a controversial statement, but Conceptualization creates things from otherwise infinitely relative infinite parts; Existence does not, and cannot. And this fact disqualifies Existence as a the Primary.

(Without first the established and absolute Ability to conceptualize, Existence can have no relationship to whatever is said to exist, since it is not Existence which DEFINES that which is said to exists/that which is observed to exist, but the conceptualizing powers of the observer. Without first this ability, nothing can be defined, and thus nothing can exist, since it is impossible–by the very defining of Existence as the metaphysical primary–to divorce Existence from that which exists.)

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The Epistemological Importance of Relatively

A will be conceptualized in terms which include what he, the observer, is not, which means that A  must also be defined in terms which include what it is not. For example, A is not the observer. Thus both the observer and A are defined, necessarily, due to the nature of observation, by comparing one to the other. A is A because it is not the observer, and vice versa. Rendered a different way, A is A because it is not B.  Which makes B a foundational reason why A is in fact A. One cannot make an existential or ontological  distinction between A and B without conceding that A and B have an existence which is entirely dependent (so to speak) upon one another, which means that neither A nor B can be themselves merely a function of themselves. Relative distinction between A and B, plus the conceptualization of the observer are all necessary in order for any definitions to be rendered for any of these things. (This is why I assert that Conceptualization and Relativity are corollaries, and are the foundation of all rational epistemology. In short, they are the only rational means by which man can know what he knows.)

So again, A is A because it is not B (where B could mean the observer) and vice versa; and this is the only means by which anything is and can be defined. Being relative to, but not B, means that A can actually be defined. For if something is not something else, only then can it be itself–and from this truth the observer is able to define that A is A. A is this, because it is observed, relatively (and only relatively) speaking, to not be that.

But if A is A absent this relative comparison–if A is A qua A, as Existence as the metaphysical Primary asserts, then:

1.  The observer cannot be present, because the presence of an observer automatically creates a relative distinction between the observer and A.  Which means that A must and will be defined in comparative terms…that is, in terms which include its relative distinction from the observer.  That is, A will be defined in terms that include what it is not. And therefore, it is impossible to claim that the existence of A is a function of itself–A qua A. If the assertion is that A is A qua A,  then the observer cannot be present, which means that no one is there to conceptualize A. In which case, how can A be defined?

2. A is infinite, with no end to itself, because an end necessitates the concession that A is distinct.  A ends, and where A ends something else not A must begin, even if the end of A is “space”. For  in this instance, where A ends, and there begins space, it must be conceded that space is in fact something, even if we merely concede that that something is simply “not A”. (Note: I do not concede that there is such a thing as space-as-an-object. My metaphysic declares a corollary relationship between relativity and conceptualization, eliminating both the need and the possibility of “empty space”, as a thing in and of itself.  I merely use space in this example to illustrate that a literal physical end to object A necessitates its relative existence with something not A, even if  we suppose that that something is merely empty space.) So again, if we accept that  A is A qua A, then we must concede that A is in fact infinite. Which means it cannot be valued, which means it cannot be defined. Hence…

3. Infinite A means that A cannot be valued, which means it cannot be defined. Which means it cannot be said to exist.

Conclusion

All of this serves to illustrate why the notion that A is A because A qua A–that is, A is itself because of itself,  from itself and to itself–is impossible. The very presence of the observer makes this fact self-evident. The very fact that A must be conceptualized in order to be defined means that A cannot be A qua A.

Remember, wherever there is someone asserting that A is A qua A, there is an observer, which thus nullifies the assertion.

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Why Existence MUST be Relative; the Existence of A is not Qua A, it is a Function of a Conceptual Comparison With B (and C, D, E, Etcetera)

Unless objects relatively exist with other objects, they cannot exist at all.  Because non-relative objects cannot be compared.  And objects which cannot be compared cannot be observed, and thus cannot be conceptualized, and thus cannot be defined.  For the presence of the observer would necessitate a comparison, at the very least between the observer and the object observed…because two or more objects cannot coexist and yet be exclusive of comparison.  It is a rational impossibility. And this is why existence must be relative.  If existence is non-relative then the comparison is impossible. If A is A because A qua A– that is, because A is absolutely A…A, infinitely so–no comparison could ever reflect the truth of A:

First, because A, infinitely so, or infinite A, must exist in a vacuum of itself.  For as soon as A is said to coexist with, say B, where B is, say, the observer, then A cannot be absolutely A. For A has an absolute limitation which is revealed by the presence of B.

And second, because A already has an ABSOLUTE definition: Itself (A). So any conceptualization (definition) of A beyond  ITSELF (Absolute Self) is an absolute lie..an absolute falseness. And what is absolutely false cannot be manifest in reality as though it were true. For it is absolutely–that is infinitely–false.  It is absolutely untrue; it is absolutely unreal; and therefore it absolutely cannot be.

Relative existence necessitates comparison which necessitates conceptualization. And since comparison/conceptualization is purely a function of relative existence, A qua A makes A absolute and therefore exclusive of observation and, by extension, comparison, which means it cannot be conceptualized, which means it cannot be defined. And that which cannot be defined cannot by definition be said to exist.

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Cause, Effect, and Movement Exist Only by the Cognition of the Observer

The human ability to conceptualize from the frame of reference of the Self is not simply an evolutionary extension of the mathematically determined machinations of an “objective reality outside” of one’s consciousness/cognition, but is integral to objective reality itself, at the most fundamental level. I submit that absent man’s ability to conceptualize the movement of what he observes (that is, man as the Observer) and to establish Self as the reference–as the constant–it is impossible that there is any movement at all, and therefore can be no evolutionary/mathematical “cause and effect” interaction of objects in the material universe.

To claim that there is any such thing as as object movement, or cause and effect interaction, once the observer is removed from the equation is impossible. Because once he who provides the reference by which any such cause and effect interaction and/or object movement has any meaning (including relevancy,  purpose, direction, velocity, distance, etc.) there is no rational argument for asserting or believing that it is happening at all in some “objective reality” that can somehow excludes the very thing that gives that reality any value.

In other words, once movement is no longer observed (and by “observed”, again, I mean not only perception, but the cognitive power of conceptualization), movement has no specific context; no reference by which it can be gauged as “movement” qua movement. This means that without a reference, all movement–and therefore all cause and effect interactions and their “mathematical” deterministic mechanisms–is relative not to a specific but to an absolute degree. And absolute relativity of movement–that is, relative interaction with no set reference provided by the conceptualizing observer–means that all movement of all objects “mathematically” sums to zero. Meaning that absolute relativity, by nature, instantaneously nullifies any movement by any object at any given moment. And if all movement in all moments sums to zero because of un-referenced relativity, then there is, in fact, no movement at all; because movement with zero value is the absence of movement, by definition.

For a simple example, let’s take object A and object B in co-existing in a vacuum (where all must exist if we concede a plurality of existence–that things which exist are utterly distinct from one another). Because of the relative nature of movement, existence in a vacuum demands that any movement by A is automatically and instantaneously transferred to B, and vice versa. There is no way in this vacuum, absent an observer, to claim that only A moves, and not B. In other words, because their existence is again necessarily relative, any movement of A is also the movement of B. And by this I mean that B’s movement is not a reciprocal movement; it’s not a corollary movement; it is the same movement; the movement of A is the movement of B. There is one, un-shared movement. B moves equally as A moves as though B were in fact acting categorically as A.

How can this be?

A scenario where two objects with a single movement by both but no reference to measure which object has moved contradicts the plurality of existence between A and B. There can be no interaction between such objects; no distinction. Any action of one is the action of the other…and because existence is an action, even rank co-existence is impossible.

In a vacuum with no observer, object A moving relative to B while B is not moving, demands the corollary that B is moving relative to A while A is not moving; which means it is axiomatic that objects A and B in the instance of any movement must have both moved and also must have both not moved at the same time. And what this means is that movement in such an absolute relative relationship is a context where the movement of objects and the absence of movement by objects are one and the same.

Which is impossible. The integration of mutually mutually exclusive properties (e.g. movement and non-movement) nullifies them both, rendering to them an existential, moral, and rational value of zero; of NOT; of VOID. That is, of a purely abstract, imagined, placeholder status.

The relative context then, and again, necessitates at a fundamental, axiomatic level the conscious perspective of the observer, who is able to conceptualize relative distinctions between objects using himSELF as the reference.

Now, Objectivists and other “empirical” philosophers will almost certainly accuse me of promulgating a Primacy of Consciousness metaphysic, but this is in large part because they suppose that one can separately categorize evidence and reason, which is not actually possible. There can be no objective, empirical evidence which is also a conceptual contradiction. Of course the light wave/particle paradox is often trotted out as a rebuttal to this assertion, but this is easily rebuffed using reason (which I won’t explain here).

I wish to be clear that I am not proposing a purely subjective, “ethereal” metaphysic…and frankly, this is an amateurish criticism. On the contrary, because rational consistency is necessary to the apprehension and definition of Truth, as the above discussion on relativity and movement indicates, it is impossible that one can claim any efficacious philosophical (metaphysics through aesthetics) positions based purely upon subjective standards. This is because subjectivism necessarily equals contradiction. And contradiction is NOT an idea, it is the absence of one.

Further, to argue that the individual conscious observer’s self-evidentiary and necessary inclusion in anything objectively true (self/evident because truth is only known by conscious individuals) is somehow a bias and a liability to reality is the very definition of absurdity. But further discussion of this is better suited to a separate article…the topic is too complex and involved to serve as a side note for this one.

The point of this article is that man’s consciousness–his conceptualizing ability–is much more than a perfunctory extension of some ethereal, evolutionary, determinative force in the “objective” universe–a force which must necessarily contradict itself by spawning such a consciousness in the first place. Rather, it is a fundamental component of rational consistency, and thus is indespensible in any definition or discussion of objective reality. Human cognition; consciousness; conceptualization; awareness of Self is inexorably tied to the metaphysical axiom–the irreducible Truth from which ALL things spring.