As described in the previous essay on this subject, object A must be defined in comparative terms with object B–or C, D, E, etc.. That is, in terms that include what is not A. And the presence of he who defines, that is, the observer, makes this fact self-evident. The observer can only know A from the frame of reference of himself. (Where Self is not a mathematical, but a metaphysical/ontological absolute. Not merely a reference, but the reference for all of what he calls Reality). Meaning, he must make the distinction as an observer between what he is and what he is not– that is, himself and, in this scenario, object A; he must make the distinction between the observed and the observer. And since the observer is required to provide the frame of reference for the definition and thus the Truth, Efficacy, and even morality of what is observed–again, in this example, object A–it is clear that A cannot exist in a vacuum of itself. The observer is required to define A in the first place, and thus declare that A, now defined as this or that, does, in fact, exist. Which brings me to…
The Utter Necessity of Existence as Simply a Function of Conceptualization:
Of course, observation is not merely observation, itself, but is, in all practical and efficacious fact, a function of conceptualization. For it would seem self-evident (though, paradoxically, this is not asserted, except when conceptualization is confused with consciousness, which is false) that absent the conceptuualization of what is observed it is impossible to define what is observed. And if what is observed has no definition then there is no rational grounds to claim that anything is actually observed at all; and thus that which is said to exist–when Existence is the metaphysical primary, and observation (empiricism) is the means of ascertaining reality–at root cannot possibly be named and thus it cannot possibly be known, and thus it cannot possibly be said to BE, period. In which case, where Existence precedes Conceptualization, it must be asserted that nothing actually exists first; and the observer then observes this “nothing” and somehow defines it. In other words, the observer is said to observe nothing (that which is nameless and utterly definition-less), which somehow exists, and then conceptualize it, after which it becomes something…that is, nothing, which exists, becomes something because of man’s conceptualizing power, and yet man has nothing to do with its existence, even though without him it cannot be known or stated what actually exists at all. Which thus undermines the argument that Existence exists prior to conceptualization, because existence absent that which is defined as having existence is not only irrelevant and irrational, but impossible. Infinite Existence as a Primary can neither be valued, nor does it imply the existence of things which can be valued. Only conceptualization can create things which are said to exist. It is a controversial statement, but Conceptualization creates things from otherwise infinitely relative infinite parts; Existence does not, and cannot. And this fact disqualifies Existence as a the Primary.
(Without first the established and absolute Ability to conceptualize, Existence can have no relationship to whatever is said to exist, since it is not Existence which DEFINES that which is said to exists/that which is observed to exist, but the conceptualizing powers of the observer. Without first this ability, nothing can be defined, and thus nothing can exist, since it is impossible–by the very defining of Existence as the metaphysical primary–to divorce Existence from that which exists.)
The Epistemological Importance of Relatively
A will be conceptualized in terms which include what he, the observer, is not, which means that A must also be defined in terms which include what it is not. For example, A is not the observer. Thus both the observer and A are defined, necessarily, due to the nature of observation, by comparing one to the other. A is A because it is not the observer, and vice versa. Rendered a different way, A is A because it is not B. Which makes B a foundational reason why A is in fact A. One cannot make an existential or ontological distinction between A and B without conceding that A and B have an existence which is entirely dependent (so to speak) upon one another, which means that neither A nor B can be themselves merely a function of themselves. Relative distinction between A and B, plus the conceptualization of the observer are all necessary in order for any definitions to be rendered for any of these things. (This is why I assert that Conceptualization and Relativity are corollaries, and are the foundation of all rational epistemology. In short, they are the only rational means by which man can know what he knows.)
So again, A is A because it is not B (where B could mean the observer) and vice versa; and this is the only means by which anything is and can be defined. Being relative to, but not B, means that A can actually be defined. For if something is not something else, only then can it be itself–and from this truth the observer is able to define that A is A. A is this, because it is observed, relatively (and only relatively) speaking, to not be that.
But if A is A absent this relative comparison–if A is A qua A, as Existence as the metaphysical Primary asserts, then:
1. The observer cannot be present, because the presence of an observer automatically creates a relative distinction between the observer and A. Which means that A must and will be defined in comparative terms…that is, in terms which include its relative distinction from the observer. That is, A will be defined in terms that include what it is not. And therefore, it is impossible to claim that the existence of A is a function of itself–A qua A. If the assertion is that A is A qua A, then the observer cannot be present, which means that no one is there to conceptualize A. In which case, how can A be defined?
2. A is infinite, with no end to itself, because an end necessitates the concession that A is distinct. A ends, and where A ends something else not A must begin, even if the end of A is “space”. For in this instance, where A ends, and there begins space, it must be conceded that space is in fact something, even if we merely concede that that something is simply “not A”. (Note: I do not concede that there is such a thing as space-as-an-object. My metaphysic declares a corollary relationship between relativity and conceptualization, eliminating both the need and the possibility of “empty space”, as a thing in and of itself. I merely use space in this example to illustrate that a literal physical end to object A necessitates its relative existence with something not A, even if we suppose that that something is merely empty space.) So again, if we accept that A is A qua A, then we must concede that A is in fact infinite. Which means it cannot be valued, which means it cannot be defined. Hence…
3. Infinite A means that A cannot be valued, which means it cannot be defined. Which means it cannot be said to exist.
All of this serves to illustrate why the notion that A is A because A qua A–that is, A is itself because of itself, from itself and to itself–is impossible. The very presence of the observer makes this fact self-evident. The very fact that A must be conceptualized in order to be defined means that A cannot be A qua A.
Remember, wherever there is someone asserting that A is A qua A, there is an observer, which thus nullifies the assertion.