When the State Asserts that Man is Both the Standard of Good and the Threat to the Good: The rational failure of a Government by and of the People

Man must be protected from himself is the argument for government in a nutshell. And this? Is a very bad argument. This sophist rationale is why freedom is never to be found under the auspices of government.

Any government.



Because freedom which is function of what an external monolith of “legal” violence, like the State, will allow is not freedom. It is, by definition, control. The phrase “that which allows us to be free” contains a fundamental contradiction in terms. Freedom does not and cannot operate under the auspices of threats of violence for stepping out of external, codified boundaries. And to say that these boundaries are what guarantees that freedom itself (in the form of unfettered wicked indulgence by the naturally depraved human being) doesn’t become oppressive is another contradiction, as it makes the restraint of freedom the foundational moral operation; it makes the limitation of freedom the means, so the argument goes, of ensuring freedom.  But unless man is able to choose his actions, by not having his behavior fundamentally dictated and coerced through threats of violence should be stray from an abstract, subjective (yes, subjective) legal code, there can be no morality. Why? Because there can be no choice. For if man cannot choose to do good, then man cannot do good at all. And actions which are compelled at gunpoint are not choices!

It is not necessarily intentional. It is not necessarily rank deception. It is most likely a function of the prevailing philosophy regarding the nature of man which has never, to my knowledge, been reconciled to reason…where reason is a place that cannot ever, under any circumstance, accommodate contradiction.


Because of man’s tendency to do evil, so the argument goes, left to his own unfettered (un-governed) devices society must inevitably dissolve into an orgy of tyranny and oppression.

This is a contradiction which nullifies the argument, and renders the practical application of it both impossible to any efficacy and ultimately destructive. For man cannot be both good and evil. What I mean by this is that he who is the standard for morality–for good–cannot also be he who wrecks this standard. He from whom rights are said to be derived cannot also be the one who poses the threat to the those very rights. Man cannot be the primary thing worth saving and the primary thing which jeopardizes that salvation.

Now, of course we may rightly assert that some human beings truly do evil and therefore are capable of harming others, but this is not the argument with which we are presented in defense of government. The argument is that human beings on the whole cannot fundamentally be trusted to exist outside of the power of coercive authority because human nature itself is depraved.

Human beings have the natural tendency toward evil, so it is argued. They are prone to it–not by choice, but because of naturally determined instinct. What this mean is that when presented with the option of good or evil, human beings, absent any external arbitrating, force, will do evil. They must…because they are driven in such an unfettered circumstance by their nature, and their nature is evil. Therefore, human beings must be governed by an outside force–a governing authority– in order to keep their natural evil in check, and to (hypocritically) ensure the existence and perpetuation of the human race by means of a rigid and regulated social apparatus that ultimately dictates all behavior by threatening its denizens with violence should they dare resist its self-proclaimed mandate to control man for the sake of man. And this is the metaphysical and ethical foundation upon which government stands. Go and see for yourself. Ask 20 people why we need government and I guarantee you that 20 of 20 will regurgitate, in some manner, the hypocritical philosophy I just explicated.

This foundational philosophy ironically and certainly inadvertently undermines the oft-trotted argument that government can exist of the people, for the people, and by the people. That is, it undermines–by its inherent and fatal contradiction–the assertion that people are the standard of the law which the government exists to uphold. If people are by nature evil, and this the root of their very being, then it simply cannot be argued that they may simultaneously represent the good which government must protect. On the contrary, if man is by nature evil, and can no more help doing evil when left to his own devices than he can help walking upright, then people in fact represent a singular threat to good. Because their nature is inexorable and absolute evil, they are the antithesis of good. And therefore, people must be controlled, not set free, by an external coercive authority. And this is exactly what they are, no matter what anyone says to the contrary. You cannot claim to be free in an environment where all of your actions are ultimately a function of what someone else says you are allowed to do.

Further, the  idea that a government can exist in the interest of a humanity which is by nature evil is to assert that the government is a proponent of evil. This, however, is never the argument for government, because though true, it wrecks the benevolent facade of coercive authority. On the contrary, the argument is always that government exists for good, and that without government, man’s evil nature will reign supreme. And what this means is that it is not man, but the government which is actually the standard of good. The people are not the standard. The people are not that from which moral “rights” are derived. The government is. For the “rights of the people” are irrelevant absent government, because absent government man’s natural evil must subordinate them. The people, then, are not the source of moral dictums, but are the singular danger to them. They are not the value of the law. They are the enemy of it. So they must be controlled.


You cannot legitimately argue that man represents that from which natural moral rights are derived, and yet at the same time claim that he is evil and represents the singular existential threat to those rights, and therefore must be governed. This is to create in man a dichotomy of nature which contradicts and nullifies itself. If man is good, and this as a function of his very nature, then it is both irrational and counterproductive to establish an institution which exists to compel moral behavior by “authoritative” (legalized)  violence. For to insist that the naturally good man must be compelled to good through violence is to deny that man can do good on his own, and this denies that his nature is in fact good.  And if man is evil, and this a function of his nature, then man cannot possibly be compelled to good, for good is utterly exclusive of his being. To compel him to good is an impossible task. For man, being evil, perverts good, he does not cultivate it. It’s like adding poison to a meal and calling it seasoning. The only thing for which the naturally evil man is fit is destruction. In either case, government is utterly beside the point.


To attempt to use force to compel the naturally evil man into goodness, or to prevent the naturally good man from losing his goodness is like attempting to compel the frog out of his frog-ness, or to prevent the frog from losing his frog-ness. The frog is by nature absolutely a frog. No amount of violence and no amount of coercion can make him a rabbit. And since the frog is by nature a frog he can pose no threat to his own frog-ness. No centralized coercive authority is necessary to prevent, nor is it effective in preventing, the frog from losing his frog-ness.

The man who is good by nature has no use for government, because by definition he cannot lose his goodness. Nor can he pose a threat to his own natural goodness (i.e. left to himself, man who is “naturally” good when governed somehow becomes “naturally” evil when free of government). Because to claim that he may pose a threat to his own goodness is to deny that he is, in fact, naturally good. And the man who is evil by nature has no use for government, because he cannot be compelled to do good. Because to claim that the man who is evil by nature can be synthesized into good is to deny that he is, in fact, naturally evil. The naturally evil man is fit only for destruction. And if he is destroyed, then there is no one to govern, and thus there is no point in government.


And all of this leads us to another truth.

Man cannot be defined according to a moral nature. And of course once we no longer define him this way, there is no rational philosophical argument for the existence of government. Why? Because government is force, and force is violence, and violence nullifies choice. The man who cannot choose is a man who cannot express his own agency; and the man who cannot express his own agency cannot express SELF. Thus, he cannot BE himself in any relevant way.

You see, man is not a moral agent in the sense that morality defines him. Man is a rational agent. What this means that man is the epistemological frame of reference for all he knows; all he thinks; all he does. That is, man being himself, where “himself” is the agent who conceptualizes existence and thus makes it relevant and meaningful, is why man knows what he knows. Because he is SELF, and absolutely so, he is able to make distinctions between good and evil, and truth and fallacy. He is the arbiter–the reference–for knowledge.

Man’s nature is not a moral one, it is to be the reference for morality—for good and evil; truth and fallacy.  HE defines and applies these things. Therefore, it is HE who governs them, not the other way around (the other way around being to make man subordinate to the very ideas and concepts which are meaningless and useless without him). For what is Truth unless it is true TO AND FOR MAN? And what is goodness unless it is good TO AND FOR MAN?

These things are worthless. They are nothing. They are non-existent.

It is man who serves as the epistemological and moral standard for all of the reality in which he exists. Man cannot rationally or productively be subordinated to a legal moral standard that derives the entirety of its value and relevancy and meaning from him. Man cannot serve moral standards, moral standards must serve him. Man does not serve truth. Truth serves him.  To erect a set of rules for man to follow and by this claim he is good is to strip man from his rightful place as the only rational moral and epistemological reference for all of truth and goodness. And once this happens, truth and goodness have no meaning…and so the rules are pointless. Rules to which man is subordinated by violence are ultimately his destruction, not his salvation.


The Ability to Conceptualize Must Precede Existence: Existence is an irrational metaphysical Primary

As described in the previous essay on this subject, object A must be defined in comparative terms with object B–or C, D, E, etc.. That is, in terms  that include what is not A.  And the presence of he who defines, that is, the observer, makes this fact self-evident. The observer can only know A from the frame of reference of himself. (Where Self is not a mathematical, but a metaphysical/ontological absolute. Not merely a reference, but the reference for all of what he calls Reality). Meaning, he must make the distinction as an observer between what he is and what he is not– that is, himself and, in this scenario, object A; he must make the distinction between the observed and the observer. And since the observer is required to provide the frame of reference for the definition and thus the Truth, Efficacy, and even morality of what is observed–again, in this example, object A–it is clear that A cannot exist in a vacuum of itself. The observer is required to define A in the first place, and thus declare that A, now defined as this or that, does, in fact, exist.  Which brings me to…


The Utter Necessity of Existence as Simply a Function of Conceptualization:

Of course, observation is not merely observation, itself, but is, in all practical and efficacious fact, a function of conceptualization. For it would seem self-evident (though, paradoxically, this is not asserted, except when conceptualization is confused with consciousness, which is false) that absent the conceptuualization of what is observed it is impossible to define what is observed. And if what is observed has no definition then there is no rational grounds to claim that anything is actually observed at all; and thus that which is said to exist–when Existence is the metaphysical primary, and observation (empiricism) is the means of ascertaining reality–at root cannot possibly be named and thus it cannot possibly be known, and thus it cannot possibly be said to BE, period.  In which case, where Existence precedes Conceptualization, it must be asserted that nothing actually exists first; and the observer then observes this “nothing” and somehow defines it.  In other words, the observer is said to observe nothing (that which is nameless and utterly definition-less), which somehow exists, and then conceptualize it, after which it becomes something…that is, nothing, which exists, becomes something because of man’s conceptualizing power, and yet man has nothing to do with its existence, even though without him it cannot be known or stated what actually exists at all. Which thus undermines the argument that Existence exists prior to conceptualization, because existence absent that which is defined as having existence is not only irrelevant and irrational, but impossible. Infinite Existence as a Primary can neither be valued, nor does it imply the existence of things which can be valued. Only conceptualization can create things which are said to exist. It is a controversial statement, but Conceptualization creates things from otherwise infinitely relative infinite parts; Existence does not, and cannot. And this fact disqualifies Existence as a the Primary.

(Without first the established and absolute Ability to conceptualize, Existence can have no relationship to whatever is said to exist, since it is not Existence which DEFINES that which is said to exists/that which is observed to exist, but the conceptualizing powers of the observer. Without first this ability, nothing can be defined, and thus nothing can exist, since it is impossible–by the very defining of Existence as the metaphysical primary–to divorce Existence from that which exists.)


The Epistemological Importance of Relatively

A will be conceptualized in terms which include what he, the observer, is not, which means that A  must also be defined in terms which include what it is not. For example, A is not the observer. Thus both the observer and A are defined, necessarily, due to the nature of observation, by comparing one to the other. A is A because it is not the observer, and vice versa. Rendered a different way, A is A because it is not B.  Which makes B a foundational reason why A is in fact A. One cannot make an existential or ontological  distinction between A and B without conceding that A and B have an existence which is entirely dependent (so to speak) upon one another, which means that neither A nor B can be themselves merely a function of themselves. Relative distinction between A and B, plus the conceptualization of the observer are all necessary in order for any definitions to be rendered for any of these things. (This is why I assert that Conceptualization and Relativity are corollaries, and are the foundation of all rational epistemology. In short, they are the only rational means by which man can know what he knows.)

So again, A is A because it is not B (where B could mean the observer) and vice versa; and this is the only means by which anything is and can be defined. Being relative to, but not B, means that A can actually be defined. For if something is not something else, only then can it be itself–and from this truth the observer is able to define that A is A. A is this, because it is observed, relatively (and only relatively) speaking, to not be that.

But if A is A absent this relative comparison–if A is A qua A, as Existence as the metaphysical Primary asserts, then:

1.  The observer cannot be present, because the presence of an observer automatically creates a relative distinction between the observer and A.  Which means that A must and will be defined in comparative terms…that is, in terms which include its relative distinction from the observer.  That is, A will be defined in terms that include what it is not. And therefore, it is impossible to claim that the existence of A is a function of itself–A qua A. If the assertion is that A is A qua A,  then the observer cannot be present, which means that no one is there to conceptualize A. In which case, how can A be defined?

2. A is infinite, with no end to itself, because an end necessitates the concession that A is distinct.  A ends, and where A ends something else not A must begin, even if the end of A is “space”. For  in this instance, where A ends, and there begins space, it must be conceded that space is in fact something, even if we merely concede that that something is simply “not A”. (Note: I do not concede that there is such a thing as space-as-an-object. My metaphysic declares a corollary relationship between relativity and conceptualization, eliminating both the need and the possibility of “empty space”, as a thing in and of itself.  I merely use space in this example to illustrate that a literal physical end to object A necessitates its relative existence with something not A, even if  we suppose that that something is merely empty space.) So again, if we accept that  A is A qua A, then we must concede that A is in fact infinite. Which means it cannot be valued, which means it cannot be defined. Hence…

3. Infinite A means that A cannot be valued, which means it cannot be defined. Which means it cannot be said to exist.


All of this serves to illustrate why the notion that A is A because A qua A–that is, A is itself because of itself,  from itself and to itself–is impossible. The very presence of the observer makes this fact self-evident. The very fact that A must be conceptualized in order to be defined means that A cannot be A qua A.

Remember, wherever there is someone asserting that A is A qua A, there is an observer, which thus nullifies the assertion.

Forgiveness Cannot be Removed From the Exculpation of Wrong

If we divorce forgiveness from exculpation, then the repentance of the wrongdoer is unnecessary. But if we divorce forgiveness from exculpation, then what exactly is forgiveness? If not forgiveness, then what is concept which describes the idea that we will no longer hold against someone an evil?

Think awhile. I’ll wait.

And if we say we will no longer hold an evil against someone who actively promotes it and refuses to reject it, then how are we not excusing it and thus tacitly promoting it ourselves? And how exactly does this help the emotionally or physically traumatized deal with their pain? How does calling evil good help victims of evil to even define the problem in the first place? 

I submit that the very concept which is forgiveness demands that it be directed to someone. Which is why it’s contractual, not psychological. Forgiveness not directed to another person or persons to me is meaningless. Obviously we cannot direct it to ourselves. If we are the innocent victims, then there is nothing of which we need to be forgiven. And if we extend it to another who rejects it then what exactly can be done with it?

Forgiveness as a bromide to sooth our emotional pain doesn’t seem consistent with its definition. Of course, I may choose to not allow another’s offense(s) to affect me either emotionally or physically or both (and there are many psychological/spiritual strategies for this) but I cannot forgive an evil act or idea that is still being actively perpetuated without tacitly excusing it. This is a bastardization of forgiveness by all rational definitions of the concept, including the Biblical one, and this makes it satanic.

Another false assertion/assumption is the idea that all “negative” emotions are somehow bad…are counter-productive. Nothing could be less true. Directing pain and anger towards an unrepentant abuser, for example, is extremely effective in motivating people to avoid the abuser and to seek justice for both themselves and other victims. It is not a desire for revenge–as the lie often goes–it is a means of self-preservation and the eradication of evil. Perpetual evil-doers–psychopaths, narcissists, and other vile sundry abusers–absolutely love the idea of forgiveness absent their repentance. Because it allows them to continue to sin without fear of reprisal and shifts the focus from their wickedness to the victim’s “bitterness”.

Reject this false forgiveness and at the very least we resist evil, reject the devil, defang lies, heap judgment upon the wicked, and rescue the innocent from the gaslighting of their oppressors.

Breaking Down the Five Primaries: 1. Metaphysics: ABILITY



The root of (object) X’s causing or being caused upon is its Ability to exist. That is, the Ability of X to be what it is the the irreducible reason it can cause anything or be caused upon.

The apple falls from the tree because it is Able to be caused upon by gravity, and this because it is Able to be “apple”. The apple divots the soft ground because it is Able to carry the velocity necessary to do so, and this because it is Able to be “apple”. 

Forgiveness is a Contract, Not a Coping Strategy

Forgiving someone who has neither asked for it nor admitted to any violation is not possible. Forgiveness not sought is pointless. For example, by definition, you cannot give a person a gift if the gift isn’t wanted or accepted.

Forgiveness as a tool for emotional healing willl have the opposite effect, and will prove destructive; and further, it really just means the excuse of evil, or the repression of one’s justifiable anger, or both. This isn’t a remediation of the wrongdoing suffered, it is a compounding of it.  And this makes it satanic.

Some may claim that forgiveness is a way we don’t allow evil people and their actions to have power over us (whatever the fuck that means). But two things:

First, you cannot say “I will love and accept you [which is precisely what forgiveness is] no matter how evil you are or what evil you remorselessly perpetrate” without at the very least tacitly excusing the evil. And excusing evil,  empowers evil. It does not neutralize it. 

Second, evil SHOULD have the “power”–that is, the effect of making us angry; to make us hurt so that we see it and feel it for the turgid crime that it is; to spur us on to demand its redaction and to furiously demand justice.

Also, to not extend forgiveness does not necessarily mean that one wishes harm or death upon the perpetrator of the violation. It is not the desire for revenge. It is simply a rational recognition of the inability to excuse guilt until the guilty admit their failure and vow to correct it.

We must remember that real forgiveness is meant to be a contract between people, a peace between the repentant wrongdoer and the wronged. It is not an emotional coping strategy for the legitimate sufferer of evil. A better coping strategy for dealing with unrepentant perpetrators of evil is justice, and/or a termination of the relationship, or even violent defense of oneself, depending on the circumstance.

Finally, in my experience I have noticed that forgiveness-absent-contrition tends to favor the evil doer, and especially authoritarian clergy people, who often shift the focus from their wickedness and mendacity to YOUR “sin” of “bitterness” and “lack of grace”.


James Madison’s Flawed Logic, and Why Government Cannot Possibly Function According to “Justly Derived Authority”

“…the rulers who are guilty of such encroachment exceed their commission from which they derive their authority and are tyrants. The people who submit to it are governed by laws made neither by themselves nor by an authority derived from them, and are slaves.” ~ James Madison, ‘A Memorial in Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments’ – 1786

What Madison fails to see is that one cannot establish an Authority and then expect that that Authority has any obligation to him at all. For if one is sufficient and capable to act (exist) on his own behalf, then no authority is needed; only cooperation. If Authority is needed, then it is implied that one is not sufficient, nor capable, to act on his own behalf. In which case, by what reasonable argument can he expect Authority to regard anything he thinks or wants?

The answer is: none

Authority will only ever act according to its “derived consent” or the “people’s mandate” when it is in fear of the people. This, of course, undermines both its point and its definition. Which is why Authority, once established, makes, as its singular priority (with the overt support of “patriots” like even Madison, himself), the assurance that it is never in such a position. Which is why all governments get bigger, not smaller.

Madison’s mortal flaw is his attempt to synthesize consensus and coercion. This is simply impossible by the very nature and definition of the concepts.

Why Existence MUST be Relative; the Existence of A is not Qua A, it is a Function of a Conceptual Comparison With B (and C, D, E, Etcetera)

Unless objects relatively exist with other objects, they cannot exist at all.  Because non-relative objects cannot be compared.  And objects which cannot be compared cannot be observed, and thus cannot be conceptualized, and thus cannot be defined.  For the presence of the observer would necessitate a comparison, at the very least between the observer and the object observed…because two or more objects cannot coexist and yet be exclusive of comparison.  It is a rational impossibility. And this is why existence must be relative.  If existence is non-relative then the comparison is impossible. If A is A because A qua A– that is, because A is absolutely A…A, infinitely so–no comparison could ever reflect the truth of A:

First, because A, infinitely so, or infinite A, must exist in a vacuum of itself.  For as soon as A is said to coexist with, say B, where B is, say, the observer, then A cannot be absolutely A. For A has an absolute limitation which is revealed by the presence of B.

And second, because A already has an ABSOLUTE definition: Itself (A). So any conceptualization (definition) of A beyond  ITSELF (Absolute Self) is an absolute lie..an absolute falseness. And what is absolutely false cannot be manifest in reality as though it were true. For it is absolutely–that is infinitely–false.  It is absolutely untrue; it is absolutely unreal; and therefore it absolutely cannot be.

Relative existence necessitates comparison which necessitates conceptualization. And since comparison/conceptualization is purely a function of relative existence, A qua A makes A absolute and therefore exclusive of observation and, by extension, comparison, which means it cannot be conceptualized, which means it cannot be defined. And that which cannot be defined cannot by definition be said to exist.


Not Primacy of Consciousness or Existence; the Primacy is of the Relativity/Conceptualization Corollary

The only difference between an infinite singularity and an infinite number of (necessarily relatively existing) parts is that the former precludes conceptualization while the latter demands it. This being the case, the proof that there is no infinite singularity but rather an infinity of parts insofar as the ontological reality of the universe is concerned is that man conceptualizes. And the proof of this is the fact that I have written this post, and that you have read it.

The fact that there is only a relatively existing infinity of parts and not an infinite singularity also serves to prove that conceptualization cannot be existentially/ontologically/metaphysically/physically divorced from reality. Relativity and conceptualization must be corollaries. In other words, man’s ability to declare what things are is fully integrated into the object reality of the universe. Without man’s naming of that which he says is, by his ability to conceptualize the relative interaction of the infinity of parts he observes, there can be nothing at all.