Monthly Archives: February 2016
Why Voting is Not in One’s Self Interest
[Updated version of “Why Voting Out of Self Interest is a Contradiction in Terms”; with many edits]
Staying with the theme of voting, and my devil’s advocate approach (again because I do not consider myself an anarchist), here is another article criticizing the efficacy and rationality of voting. In this article, I take a much more denunciatory approach, questioning not merely the relevancy of voting–specifically for public officials in a representative democracy–but the morality of it. I l attempt to effectively argue why voting is a fundamental denial of one’s own self, and a capitulation to rule that must inevitably lead to one’s own categorical destruction.
Perhaps this is hyperbole. Judge for yourself. And feel free to disagree and comment. I am very interested in your perspectives on this controversial topic.
1.
Voting, I submit, is a contradiction to self, and a rank opponent of self-interest, and therefore an opponent of self-existence. And this is because, I aver, voting always implies an authority/submission dynamic–henceforth referred to as a “politic”. That is, to vote for someone to occupy a specific office implies that that office is one in which appealing to authority–which means appealing to force–is the fundamental means of discharging the duties of that office. This in turn nullifies the nominal purpose of voting (the affirmation of the self via representation) and therefore demands that all representative democracies inevitably morph into tyrannies sooner or later. Usually sooner.
But before we can discuss the conclusion, naturally we must examine the rationale that I submit takes us there.
2.
When it comes to claims that voting is not in the self-interest of the voter, the most obvious and perhaps most stark evidentiary argument can be found with those who voted for the loser of an election: the minority vote. Indeed, it seems almost a poor use of time explicating the reasons why voting is not in the interest of those voters on the losing side of the election. Nevertheless, the self-evidentiary nature of such reasons may not be so…well, self-evident, given the common assumptions with respect to the presumed benevolence of a representative democracy. So let’s go ahead and examine the reasons.
The assertion:
The voting process whereby the majority elects the one who will act (ostensibly) as a representative of the “people” means that the self-interest of the minority–those who did not cast votes for the representative elected–is not served by the vote. Keeping in mind that “self-interest” is defined by the individual, not the representative nor the collective which he or she ostensibly serves. For only the individual has the absolute context of “self” whereby self can be sufficiently known in order to ultimately determine what it truly needs and desires.
By definition, then, and ironically, the representative, or official, who has been elected to represent the minority has neither been elected by them, nor can he or she represent them, since such an official, during his or her running for office, must have openly declared that what they support and affirm with respect to the purpose and plans of that office is contrary to what the minority voters desired. In which case the official must necessarily officiate his or her responsibilities in a manner contrary to the will of certain people–people who are nevertheless obligated to submit to the authority given to the official by other voters who are not their political allies, and who may even promote ideas which are diametrically opposite.
Now, one might be tempted to make the argument that, given certain constitutional dictates, or the freedom to move out of the given geopolitical area, the minority voter is not necessarily bound to an elected official’s authority. But I submit that this reveals a lack of true understanding of the root philosophical premises and implications which underwrite the idea of voting…premises and implications one necessarily concedes by engaging in the voting process in the first place.. These premises (which we will discuss momentarily) and implications have consequences which must inevitably reach across all geopolitical boundaries and eventually affect the whole of humanity, and define its condition.
But at the very least, to argue that one who finds himself or herself under the authority of an official they did not consign to office is not necessarily obligated to submit to that official’s authority, is to render their vote, as well as the voting process irrelevant entirely, thus supporting my case that voting cannot in fact serve their self-interest.
My point here is that there is no reason to vote for someone who shall have no power over the voter to affect outcomes; who shall possess no philosophical mandate to exert some manner of control–of force. And even more concisely: to vote is to implicitly condone rank authority over one’s life via the power granted by the vote to he or she who has been elected–as a function of their office. Period. In other words, voting does not imply freedom from coercive force by authority, but affirms it. If authority is not granted by the vote, then I submit what one is doing is not voting, and that voting is moot.
But some may argue that voting is voluntary. Thus, voting is not a binding of oneself inexorably to authority, but rather an exercise of free will.
I would counter this claim by saying that authority and free will are mutually exclusive. That if we accept that the vote implies the authority of the elected official to act, then free will is non-applicable to the process. Indeed, this is almost my entire point of this article: that free will in the case of democratic voting is in fact an illusion. Perhaps a convincing illusion due to the deft nature of the sophist arguments in support of voting, but an illusion nonetheless.
In other words, I submit that it is a contradiction, and thus impossible, to bind oneself willingly to authority, since authority is the power to compel behavior by force (if there is no implicit force there is no explicit authority). Once force…once threats of punishment or death enter the equation, free will is irrelevant. For choosing to obey or to be shot/imprisoned (or otherwise punished) is NOT a legitimate choice.
But to willingly and freely accept the requests of another in one’s own self-interest is to fundamentally grant allegiance first and foremost to one’s own self-interest. And one never to votes for one’s own interest. It is what one does by nature. Thus, such a relationship is not and cannot be dependent on a vote, but on volunteerism. And volunteerism is obviously not efficacious by authority, but by cooperation. That is, it is not a relationship based upon an authority/submission politic, but on the voluntary mutual exchange of value.
Where there is no authority there is no force. And where there is no force there is no sacrifice of ANY individuals. And where there is no sacrifice of any individuals (like the minority voter) there is no efficacy not purpose of voting. For if those elected to office NEVER have the power to compel behavior by force, then it does not matter who is elected to office, or if anyone is. People are free to cooperate with those they like, and to eschew cooperation with those they do not. Since officials have no authority over any person, any person’s vote for them is irrelevant. Any person can choose to interact with them in whatever capacity they want, or not. And thus if voting doesn’t imply a right to rule–to compel–then what exactly is the point of voting?
Or said another way, of what use is voting for someone with whom you will only ever engage cooperatively–that is, of your own will and according to your own interest?
None at all.
Therefore I argue that when one votes he or she must implicitly accept the idea that submission to authority is the efficacious and rational means of effecting outcomes as a function of the relationship one has with his or her elected official. And this context, I submit, must inevitably expand to includes one’s very existence, in general. He or she who refuses to submit themselves, and their very will, to he or she who has been elected by the majority vote, acts hypocritically with respect to voting, thus nullifying the voting process altogether, and their own identity of SELF (more on this in a moment) because they have refused the necessary authority/submission politic which they must have implicitly conceded as the fundamental philosophical rationale for casting their vote in the first place; and this in order to not render the act of voting an act of hypocrisy.
One cannot have his or her cake and eat it too. If one affirms the efficacy and morality of voting, by voting, then one is ethically obligated to the outcome of that vote, whatever it is, whomever is elected. What one wants, or believes is the moral or rational means to organize society one’s own life, or whatever other issue with which they happen to concern themselves, besides the point. One alaways votes not for cooperation, but for rule. One votes for a politic which demands that cooperation is fundamentally irrelevant. To vote is to submit, and this by the very nature of voting. And this concession to one’s individual submission is the irony which makes voting moot.
One could also put it this way: If the vote necessarily nullifies the free will of the minority voters by subjecting them to the coercive power–the authority–of the official, then I submit that everyone’s free will is nullified. That is, even what those who voted for the official want is besides the point. It may appear to be cooperation at first glance, but if force can be used to compel the will of those who voted against the official, then we must assume that force is the operative means by which everyone is compelled.
If one agrees with the official, good for them, they are not ostensibly forced. But at any time should that person withdraw his or her support, he or she shall be forced to comply with the authority granted by the vote, just like any other minority voter who must endure the consequences of the vote. And this makes the person’s willful compliance irrelevant. The official doesn’t need their will. He or she doesn’t need their choice. And thus, he or she doesn’t actually need their vote. In which case, force, then, not cooperation, is the operative root behind the actions of the elected official. Which again demands that voting is not really relevant at all, but is actually a metaphysical declaration that at one’s root, will, and therefore consciousness itself, shall be rendered moot, and that one must be compelled by force alone to outcomes desired by the authority.
3.
If social outcomes–if the social organization of human reality is a matter of who may compel the behavior of others by force, and this the premise behind voting, then voting is irrelevant. Voting for someone is irrelevant. Who rules is irrelevant. Authority–not ideas, not people, not cooperation–is the method of organizing human existence, in which case authority is the foundation of reality. The context of the individual–of self-awareness, free will and choice–is an anathema to the authority/submission politic. The life of the individual ceases to be the context. The frame of reference of the individual is not the yardstick of morality, conceptual efficacy, and truth. Rather, death, the absence of such a context, the absence of such a frame of reference, the absence of self becomes the measurement by which a moral and true society–that is, reality–is gauged. And yet it doesn’t take an Aristotle to spot the implicit contradiction and predict the inevitable disaster.
4.
And so, even though I began this article by using the minority vote as an example of how voting itself undermines and contradicts its own meaning, relevancy, and purpose, I think I have illustrated how, because of the authority/submission politic necessarily demanded by voting and the self-denial that authority must command to be consistent with its premises, no one actually gains by conceding and instituting the vote as the means of establishing social, political, and economic structure. Further, I think that I have established that no one is ever, nor can they be, actually represented by he or she who is voted into office, because what one thinks, from the frame of reference of oneself, which is their only frame of reference, is irrelevant. And that to vote, whatever the outcome, is to concede that one–the individual–does not actually possess the metaphysical ability–that is, that natural ability–to apprehend reality and existence enough cast a vote in the first place. For to vote for someone to represent you is to concede that someone else must, and is able, to be you, for you. In which case, of what relevancy are you?
None at all.
If you can somehow exist and shall exist and manifest your own life by proxy, then there is no relevant context for you qua you. Which makes you–the root “is” that is you–of zero value. You qua you are actually a stumbling block to reality, and a hole in your own existence.
5.
To vote is not to cooperate. Cooperation nullifies the relevancy of voting because cooperation affirms the infinite value of every individual, which then denies the authority/submission politic implicit to voting. There are no losers in cooperative exchange. There are no “minority” participants, no “lesser” contributors. No one is collectivized in this a way, or in any way. There is no sacrifice of “minority” participants to authority by election, only everyone’s fundamental self-interest.
Further, cooperation implies the freedom of individuals to not cooperate, and freedom from punitive measures as a consequence of non-cooperation, because the innate metaphysical value of the individual, even absent his or her cooperation, is still affirmed and established as the moral and rational standard.
But there is no freedom to opt out of the outcomes of a vote once one has cast it. Because at the heart of voting is, again, the idea that an individual can be represented. And the idea of representation bespeaks of a metaphysical premise which says that the individual is somehow able to exist by proxy. And to deny the outcome of the vote, to not submit, is to deny the premise. And therefore to deny he or she who was elected to represent oneself is tantamount to self–denial. And those who deny self are walking contradictions, and can expect to have no say in anything at all because they have forsaken themselves, which is: the authority of the official in power because of the vote, which they have conceded and to which they have agreed to submit by casting a vote in the first place. Those people should expect nothing but to be considered and treated as as enemies of a society and reality founded upon the authority/submission politic via the vote.
6.
In conclusion, I submit that voting and cooperation are mutually exclusive because they imply utterly opposing metaphysical premises with respect to those individuals governed by the outcomes of elections. To vote is to assume that one may be represented by another who is absolutely outside oneself, which is an impossible contradiction. But there is no such representation in cooperation. To cooperate, everyone must represent themselves, and all of us must recognize the infinite worth of one other, as individuals.
But as always, judge for yourselves the veracity of my arguments. I am open to all ideas.
Why a Plurality of Existence is Impossible (audio version)
Link to audio:
Why a Plurality of Existence is Impossible (updated version)
[Here is a reblog of my previous article, with significant additions and edits. ]
“Existence exists”, not distinct existences, so the metaphysical premise goes.
So, let’s be clear about what this means. It’s not the tree which is the metaphysical primary, okay, but the existence of the tree. And since existence is the primary, and all things “objectively” exist, existence becomes a de facto singularity, not a plurality, since there is and can be no relevant difference between the existence of objects. In other words, if all things exist, and existence is the metaphysical primary, then all things must exist equally. It cannot be said that on the primary metaphysical level one thing–one object–exists more or less than another. Meaning that when it comes to existence, there are no relevant distinctions between the existence of objects…between that which equally–in equal measure–applies to all objects, regardless of what the objects are; regardless of the nature of the objects. And an irrelevant distinction is in fact no distinction at all. For nature does not trump the metaphysical primary in terms of describing the absolute, infinite, unchanging essence of a thing. Nature thus becomes moot if in fact the metaphysical primary is one of absolute and infinite equality.
Additionally, it is not the nature of objects which drives the supreme relevancy of existence, as though it functions according to its own separate paradigm. For in that case the metaphysical primary would be absolutely bound to “nature”, making it a direct function of existence. But in that case, how can there be distinctions of nature? If nature is in essence the metaphysical primary, and thus must apply in full and equal measure–absolute and infinite–to all objects, then how can any relevant distinctions be defined by nature?
They cannot.
So then, for nature to apply as a means to provide relevant distinctions between objects it really cannot have anything directly to do with the metaphysical primary. It must apply particularly to specific objects, in varying degrees, and not equal amongst objects. But this becomes impossible and irrelevant to that which does apply absolutely equally to all objects–that is, the metaphysical primary, because that which IS all things, the primary, nullifies that which is in opposition to it–in this case, a “plurality of existence according to nature”–which attempts to subordinate existence, the metaphysical primary, to nature, in order to rationalize a plurality of existence. This is obviously contradictory, and thus illogical and impossible.
Nature, then, cannot be the one thing which all things equally share, but also by which objects can be defined distinctly, because this is a contradiction in terms. In short, nature cannot be rationally incorporated into the metaphysical primary of existence, which again must be singular, because it–that is nature–is considered a property unique and of various value or degree to objects. Since existence, the primary, must rationally apply to all objects equally, then by definition there can be no unique and ultimately distinctive properties amongst those objects.
In every case then, I submit, there can be no plurality of existence for the simple fact that there must be some singular and absolute commonality which binds all objects by forming the very essence from which they all are a direct function, and which resolves the existential mutual exclusivity of objects which are said to be “plurality” at the fundamental, primary metaphysical level really must mean mean is infinitely distinct…or infinite distinction. Which is of course impossible. For even what is “plural” in existence must have a common context whereby the plurality is not infinite distinction between objects–which again is really the metaphysic of the mutual exclusivity of objects–in order that actual efficacious interaction between and amongst objects can occur. And that context is the metaphysical primary. And it is not plural, but utterly and infinitely inclusive and singular.
Does Voting Matter?: An argument for non-participation (Audio version)
Does Voting Matter?: An argument for non-participation
In this article I will present to you an argument which questions the practical relevancy of voting. I consider this a “devil’s advocate” perspective, because I do NOT consider myself an anarchist…that is, one who denies any and all efficacy of government. And though it may seem that I have convinced myself one way or another on this, I assure you I have not. I have pondered the question of the true value and efficacy of government and have not been able to utterly conclude and convince myself that government cannot work. Indeed, I would submit that given the right context government can be exceedingly beneficial, and there are objective examples of this which can be cited. Many of my close friends are politically active and I by no means intend to disparage their interest or their opinions.
This article is one regarding, particularly, voting, not necessarily government qua government as we currently observe it. However, in order to address that topic I needed to examine what I believe can be argued is the fundamental premise which underwrites government currently (but not necessarily absolutely, and not necessarily initially or innately) and proceed to make my argument from there. So that’s what I did.
But I admit that my premise may be flawed, and though it may sound like it, I am by no means suggesting that voting is necessarily inherently useless or perpetuates a malevolent system or idea. This is only true if we accept the premise, which we may not. And if the premise is true. Which I concede it may not be.
*
“Does voting really matter?”
Wait. Before you answer, let me put it another way:
Does it really matter who gets elected? And don’t think transiently. Think ultimately. Think: does it matter, when the premise of government has realized its ultimate purpose and necessary conclusion, who holds office and who does not? For every premise must lead to a practical outcome, and this outome is inevitable if the premise is consistently underwriting and perpetuating the apparatus of that which is established upon it. Which of course it will be, for otherwise that which has been established upon the premise will deviate so far from the premise that it will no longer fit the definition or practical description of that which has been established. In other words, as long as government as we know it currently is defined as “government”, instead of something else, or “government”, but qualified by a definition which is markedly different from what is observed, then the premise will persist. Which means the conclusion must necessarily be realized.
I guess I should pause here and ask: what is the premise which underwrites government? Do you know? Have you given it much thought? If not, don’t worry. Most people haven’t. Oh, certainly people have ideas and opinions about what government should and shouldn’t do for and to people, how big or small it should be, and what kind of power it should possess for the purposes of structuring people’s lives, and what kinds of institutions it should be able to legally establish on behalf of certain constituents, or itself, or what offices should exist and for how long the terms of these offices should be. In other words, many people have ideas and opinions with respect to government after the premise. But this isn’t the real issue…meaning it isn’t the root issue, or even, really, and ultimately, the operative issue. And further, government isn’t really rooted in the nature of itself, but…
The real issue is the nature of man. Of you and I. Of the individual over which the government will rule, or for which the government will act on his or her behalf.
So I ask again: what is the premise behind government?
Think about it.
…
…
Okay, that’s enough time. Do you have it? No? That’s okay, I will tell you what the premise is.
The premise is that man, according to his nature, must be governed. That at best, man free from the compelling force of a central authority will necessarily, again by nature, organize an existence inferior to that established through government. And it will be so inferior that it must fail eventually, because the nature of man is to consider himself an individual first, entitled to the full sum and substance of what is procured and expressed by that existence, which thus must lead to the individual subjective cognitive definition of existence which in turn must lead to chaos, and the wild and unfettered exploitation and destruction of humanity at the hands of itself.
And because of this premise regarding man’s nature, governments are established (by men, a contradiction never really addressed) to create an “objective” and “organized” society so that man will not dissolve into a sea of anarchy and an orgy of sin, but will flourish and prosper in peace and plenty, and will survive to pass on this objective and benevolent existence to his children, who will, under the authority (to compel by force) of government, also experience such prosperity.
In other words, and to put it more precisely. Man needs governing because he will literally destroy himself without it. Man thus needs government to create an organized reality for him, to ensure his survival and to promote his well being. And what this really means is that man, himself, individually, is fundamentally insufficient to his own existence. He possesses neither the innate epistemological adequacy or the metaphysical singularity–the fundamental Ability–which can amount to anything efficacious, relevant, or moral at all. Therefore:
Man qua man = the death of man
Which means that man qua man = the absence, or the the NOT, of man, meaning that to exist as man is to, in fact, contradict man.
And therefore, according to the premise of government then…
Government = the life of man; which means the TRUTH of man
And therefore…
Governement = the true and actual existence of man, and thus the efficacy and relevancy of man
Which means…
Government = man; or Government IS man, FOR man.
And because this is the foundational premise of government, the reality is–and this will scandalize–that in the matter of the democratic voting by the people for their public representatives it simply, ultimately, does not matter WHO gets elected. For he or she who represents the people–the collective–cannot by definition represent the individual. Indeed, the very title “public representative” or “public servant” reveals the inherent contradiction. There is no “people”, no “public”–it’s an abstraction that has been infused by false metaphysics with some kind practical efficacy. But this efficacy is also false, for what is wholly abstract cannot have any benevolent or rational effect upon man’s non-abstract experience. The “public” is an ideal. The individual is what’s real. Thus, a public servant cannot by definition serve individuals. A public servant serves the ideal. He or she serves the abstraction of “public”.
And what is the purpose of an abstraction? The purpose of an abstract concept is to affirm and promote that (he or she or they) which utilizes it in service to their practical organization of the environment in order to realize a desired outcome. We use abstractions like “left” and “right” and “over” and “beyond” and “miles” to get where we want to go. SImilarly, the government uses the abstraction of “public good” to go where it desires to go. And it desires to go, always and ever, back to where it started: the premise. Man needs governing. Man can only really efficaciously and truly exist through government. Government’s existence IS man’s existence. (And isn’t this the notion we all seem to concede at some level and to some degree–that humanity perishes without government?) Thus, man must be compelled to the affirmation of that which is his only true self: the government.
To be a public servant then is not to serve the individual, but to serve the government, which is the material establishment of the abstraction of “public”. Individual existence, according to the premise, must be subordinated to the governing representative in order that true existence–public, collective existence, determined and defined according to the dictates of governing authority which wields self-legalized force as the ultimate means of compelling individual submission and represents the abstract (“transcendent” is actually how it is described) ideal of “public”–can be realized. Once this objective is finally fully realized, we are assured that paradise will be manifest.
*
Now, it is no surprise that the philosophical–especially metaphysical–premise which affirms government could very well mean that the worst kinds of people will seek positions in it. And because the inherent authoritarianism of government can be said to cater to those with proclivities towards authoritarianism–because they are the ones who naturally thrive in such an environment–it is to be expected that most people in positions of public power might likely trend, personality-wise, to the antisocial side of the psychological spectrum. Thus, to be suspicious of politicians and political candidates is both a natural and rational mindset for people.
However, it would be a bit shortsighted to turn this natural and perfectly understandable suspicion into a cause by which we might engage in entertaining the notion that it actually makes a difference who we vote for and who we don’t; who is elected and who isn’t.
It doesn’t.
Because when it comes right down to the root of things, it is NOT the nature of people that is the problem. It is the nature of government–or rather the philosophy from which government springs. It doesn’t matter WHO is governing, because the outcomes are predicated ultimately not on what these individuals do or don’t do, or what their personality is or isn’t, but on the metaphysical premises which necessitate government in the first place. You see, government is not erected upon itself–it doesn’t spring from its own vacuum. It is merely a logical extesion of the aforementioned premise. Because man needs governing, there will be government, and it will fundamentally look a certain way, and it will fundamentally act a certain way. It will root all of what it practically accomplishes upon the necessary right it assumes to compel individual behavior by force, because this is what is demanded by the premise.
To put it another way, the problem isn’t the hypothetical malevolent or psychologically immoral government official–indeed, we just as well might assume that all officials are in fact benevolent and well-intentioned. But the be the benevolent official cannot redefine the premise (or can he or she? You decide.). Government renders such benevolence moot according to its nature. No matter how well-intentioned a government official is, his or her actions will be given categorical moral and practical value by the absolute philosophical context of government. There is no such thing as “good” individuals in government. Because government has nothing to do with individuals.
Now, occasionally government will act in spite of the root premise, and individuals will benefit from the altruism. When the rights of personal property are upheld; when dangerous criminals are removed from society and neutralized; when peace is brokered between nations and war averted. These are good things, and government is rightly lauded for them. But eventually the government working from the premise will create so many opportunities for it to act in spite of itself that these altruistic acts must inevitably decline, and then finally be eschewed altogether. For government cannot act in the interest of its own demise…by definition it cannot act out of the assumption that it has no right to act. And since act it must, to its own end, according to the premise which validates its very existence, act it will. In other words, these acts of altruism will eventually be seen, when enough opportunities for them arise, as either existential threats to government, or a means by which its mandate to rule can be further realized through manipulating them. And at this point, functionally, they no longer occur at all.
So…why vote then?
To limit government?
No. To say the government is too powerful and that we need to elect person x, y, or z to curtail it is a contradiction, because what we are really saying is that the government needs to limit its power BY its power. That is, we accept the contradiction that government can restrict government. If the government uses its power to limit itself then its “limitation” is really an extension of its power.
The argument can be convincingly made that if one was really free then it wouldn’t matter who they vote for because no one would have the power to compel their behavior by force. And the corollary to this then is that if they are not really free and the government can compel their behavior by force then it likewise doesn’t matter who they vote for. Either way their life is fundamentally a product of what the government says they can and cannot do.
Further, since we have no frame of reference for freedom in the truest sense (freedom from compelling force), I submit we can never actually vote on “issues” related to the people, which must and can only find practical relevancy at the individual level. For these things only rationally exist in a context of freedom from force, and government by nature is the antipode of this. Thus, we can never vote for what we think would be in our best interest, because ultimately our interests are besides the point.
When all is said and done, and regardless of whatever reasons we may conjure up for ourselves, and even if we truly believe those ideas, we all pay our taxes and obey other laws because if we don’t we will find ourselves in prison. And since this fact is constant and unchanging across elections, again I ask: does voting matter?
It’s a good question.
You decide.
Why a Plurality of Existence is Impossible
“Existence exists”, not distinct existences, so the metaphysical premise goes.
So, let’s be clear about what this means. It’s not the tree which is the metaphysical primary, okay, but the existence of the tree. And since existence is the primary, and all things “objectively” exist, existence becomes a de facto singularity, not a plurality, since there is and can be no relevant difference between the existence of objects. In other words, if all things exist, and existence is the metaphysical primary, then all things must exist equally. It cannot be said that on the primary metaphysical level one thing–one object–exists more or less than another. Meaning that when it comes to existence, there are no relevant distinctions between the existence of objects…between that which equally–in equal measure–applies to all objects, regardless of what the objects are; regardless of the nature of the objects. And an irrelevant distinction is in fact no distinction at all. For nature does not trump the metaphysical primary in terms of describing the absolute, infinite, unchanging essence of a thing. Nature thus becomes moot if in fact the metaphysical primary is one of absolute and infinite equality.
Additionally, it is not the nature of objects which drives the supreme relevancy of existence, as though it functions according to its own separate paradigm. For in that case the metaphysical primary would be absolutely bound to “nature”, making it a direct function of existence. But in that case, how can there be distinctions of nature? If nature is in essence the metaphysical primary, and thus must apply in full and equal measure–absolute and infinite–to all objects, then how can any relevant distinctions be defined by nature?
They cannot.
So then, for nature to apply as a means to provide relevant distinctions between objects it really cannot have anything directly to do with the metaphysical primary. It must apply particularly to specific objects, in varying degrees, and not equal amongst objects. But this becomes impossible and irrelevant to that which does apply absolutely equally to all objects–that is, the metaphysical primary, because that which IS all things, the primary, nullifies that which is in opposition to it–in this case, a “plurality of existence according to nature”–which attempts to subordinate existence, the metaphysical primary, to nature, in order to rationalize a plurality of existence. This is obviously contradictory, and thus illogical and impossible.
Nature, then, cannot be the one thing which all things equally share, but also by which objects can be defined distinctly, because this is a contradiction in terms. In short, nature cannot be rationally incorporated into the metaphysical primary of existence, which again must be singular, because it–that is nature–is considered a property unique and of various value or degree to objects. Since existence, the primary, must rationally apply to all objects equally, then by definition there can be no unique and ultimately distinctive properties amongst those objects.
In every case then, I submit, there can be no plurality of existence for the simple fact that there must be some singular and absolute commonality which binds all objects by forming the very essence from which they all are a direct function, and which resolves the existential mutual exclusivity of objects which are said to be “plurality” at the fundamental, primary metaphysical level really must mean mean is infinitely distinct…or infinite distinction. Which is of course impossible. For even what is “plural” in existence must have a common context whereby the plurality is not infinite distinction between objects–which again is really the metaphysic of the mutual exclusivity of objects–in order that actual efficacious interaction between and amongst objects can occur. And that context is the metaphysical primary. And it is not plural, but utterly and infinitely inclusive and singular.
Why is Causality (Cause and Effect) Not Determinative? Because It’s Not Real: The purely conceptual nature of “cause and effect”
With respect to the determinative power of causality, I submit that there is none. In support of this assertion I have developed the following explication, which reveals the nullifying contradiction of “cause and effect” when it is extracted from its purely conceptual context:
There can be no cause qua cause until after the effect is manifest. For what is a cause without an effect? It is certainly not a cause. For if a cause has not actually caused anything, then it is not a cause by definition. In this way, then, anything which we would qualify as cause is categorically dependent for its rational and efficacious definition as a “cause” upon the effect.
Furthermore, we must also assert that there is no effect then which can exist except utterly independent of the cause. For unless the effect exists independently of the cause, it must be considered a direct and absolute function of the cause. But if it is a direct and absolute function of the cause, then the distinction is eliminated, which then obliterates the very root essence of “cause and effect” in the first place, relegating it to irrelevance, and thus nonexistence…for that which is existentially irrelevant contradicts itself right out of existence.
Speaking of contradiction, note the following:
By the previous logic, cause and effect, being entirely distinct from one another, must therefore have entirely autonomous, separate existence already, prior to the confluence which is defined as “cause and effect” qua “cause and effect”. In other words, there can be no effect unless the effect is an effect alone, absent any cause, before any cause manifests itself as a cause. Which then makes, by logical extension, the cause only a cause if it itself exists as such autonomously, absent the effect, before any effect manifests itself as an effect. In other words, each one must exist already as a prerequisite for “cause and effect” to meet any sort of rationally consistent criteria in order to be defined as such: the effect is an effect prior to the cause causing it; and the cause is a cause prior to it actually having caused anything.
The cause needs the effect to be defined as the cause; and the effect needs the cause to be defined as an effect. But the effect cannot be a direct function of the cause without eliminating the distinction; and the cause cannot be given its absolute meaning and relevancy by the effect without likewise eliminating the distinction. But if the effect exists as the effect utterly independent of the cause, and the cause exists as the cause utterly independent of the effect, then what we assert is that an effect doesn’t actually require a cause to be an effect, and a cause doesn’t actually require an effect to be a cause. Which…destroys the definitions of both, nullifying their “autonomous”, “independent” existence.
The point is that no matter from which angle approach it, you inevitably run into an impenetrable wall of contradiction.
And so it goes when we attempt to incorporate mutually exclusive conceptual abstractions into the non-abstract material universe of actual objects by assuming and imagining that they are likewise, themselves, in possession of a material, actual essence.
The solution to reconciling the contradictions now becomes apparent. We must not consider cause and effect an actual, catalyzing causal force…like we spuriously do with the laws of physics when we describe them as “governing”. We must recognize cause and effect for what it really is: a concept human beings use to describe the relative movement of objects in the environment, objects which are fundamentally neither caused nor effected but are rooted in the infinity of their own absolute and infinitely singular material essence, in whatever form it happens to be observed, and as a function of whatever relative context in which it happens to be observed.
Indeed–and in conclusion–the presence of relativity in object interactions precludes any actual (materially “existent”, for lack of a better term) cause and effect; yet it necessitates a conceptual cause and effect that the self-aware agent engages as a means to define and identify both what an object is, and how it is observed (i.e. its position relative to the observer at any given moment).
unreformingtheology 