There is No Such Thing as Existential Plurality, There is Only Corollary: A Foundational Pillar of What I Call Objective Relativity

There is no such thing as plurality, only corollary.

This is a maxim which, though it may appear simple, if not somewhat abstruse, is predicated upon hours and hours of thought and discursive logic. I am arguing from several different angles here, all of them equally effective in proving the maxim, I think.

1.

The non-existence of space. That is, I reject the idea that a vacuum of things (the absence of that which IS) is a thing in and of itself. That which is the absence of all that exists cannot, by necessity AND by definition, itself exist.  Of course, the idea of plurality of existence depends upon the notion that there is a physical separation of objects: that A is literally distinct from B, and this because of the actual presence of absence (contradiction alert) between them. This is an utterly irrational assertion and conclusion. If space is a thing, then what, for instance, is between space and objects A and B? Space, being itself an object, would need to be absolutely distinct from A and B, as A and B are absolutely distinct from each other. So now, instead of a plurality of existence between objects A and B, you have a plurality of existence  betweem objects A and B and space–let’s call space, C. Which means that now you must insert object D, which is the space between A and C and, B and C. Which means that now you must introduce object E, which is the space between A and C and D; and B and C and D. And this goes on indefinitely. Once the distinction–the space–between A and B becomes itself its own existent object, you have created an infinite number of “spaces”  between objects. Thus, to define plurality this way makes any existential relationship–any actual interaction between A and B–impossible…because they have become INFINITELY distinct. The fact that they exist infinitely distinct from one another means that their existence cannot accommodate or integrate the existence of any other object. They are completely defined by the infinity of their absolutely distinct existence. Thus, things become merely distinction itself. And distinction, as I’ve already explained, is not a thing itself, but the absence of things.

2.

A and B relate relatively to one another. At no point, except conceptually, does either object form the objective reference of the relationship. Depending upon the needs and frame of reference of the conceptualizing agent (the observer), either A is the reference OR B is the reference. In and of themselves, A and B are existentially and thus relationally absolutely identical. There is NO objective distinction, and thus no definition, possible unless the conceptualizing agent is there to provide the conceptual context whereby A or B can, at any given moment, become the reference for the relative relationship.  What this means is that the idea of a literal distinction between objects A and B is impossible, because that kind of distinction, being wholly relative, is, in and of itself, impossible to define. Only the conceptualizing agent can provide the context whereby any relationship, and thus any true, relevant, and therefore actual distinction, is possible.

3.

Number two being the case, there can be no actual distinction absent the observation of the conceptualizing agent. Observation of a thing, however, in order to produce a concept (by which the observer is known to actually observe someTHING), requires a relative relationship between A and B. But a relative relationship requires relatively existing objects…and note the plural form of that word.  Relativity between objects demands that there can be no SINGULAR object which exists in and of itself. For without a relative relationship, which requires two or more objects, no object can be defined; for EVERY object which is said to be this or that can only be defined according to how it RELATIVELY relates to another object (or other objects). This makes literal, physical plurality impossible. For it is not the DISTINCTION between A and B which ultimately creates their definitions, but the fact that they are existential COROLLARIES. That is, the existence of A inexorably demands the corollary existence of B. There is no A without its corollary B, and vice versa. I am not saying A is B, I am saying they are corollaries.  I am saying that their distinction is one of utterly relative relationship, resulting in the concept, by the observer, which becomes A, and the concept which becomes B.

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The following is a true paradox, not a contradiction in terms presented as a paradox because some people are too lazy to fully and properly think it through. (And by “some people” I mean many scientists, as well as most (other) religious people, especially and including Christians.)

A thing which has no parts cannot exist; and therefore all things must contain an infinite number of parts.

Why a Plurality of Existence is Impossible (updated version)

[Here is a reblog of my previous article, with significant additions and edits. ]

“Existence exists”, not distinct existences, so the metaphysical premise goes.

So, let’s be clear about what this means. It’s not the tree which is the metaphysical primary, okay, but the existence of the tree. And since existence is the primary, and all things “objectively” exist, existence becomes a de facto singularity, not a plurality, since there is and can be no relevant difference between the existence of objects. In other words, if all things exist, and existence is the metaphysical primary, then all things must exist equally. It cannot be said that on the primary metaphysical level one thing–one object–exists more or less than another. Meaning that when it comes to existence, there are no relevant distinctions between the existence of objects…between that which equally–in equal measure–applies to all objects, regardless of what the objects are; regardless of the nature of the objects. And an irrelevant distinction is in fact no distinction at all. For nature does not trump the metaphysical primary in terms of describing the absolute, infinite, unchanging essence of a thing. Nature thus becomes moot if in fact the metaphysical primary is one of absolute and infinite equality.

Additionally, it is not the nature of objects which drives the supreme relevancy of existence, as though it functions according to its own separate paradigm. For in that case the metaphysical primary would be absolutely bound to “nature”, making it a direct function of existence. But in that case, how can there be distinctions of nature? If nature is in essence the metaphysical primary, and thus must apply in full and equal measure–absolute and infinite–to all objects, then how can any relevant distinctions be defined by nature?

They cannot.

So then, for nature to apply as a means to provide relevant distinctions between objects it really cannot have anything directly to do with the metaphysical primary. It must apply particularly to specific objects, in varying degrees, and not equal amongst objects. But this becomes impossible and irrelevant to that which does apply absolutely equally to all objects–that is, the metaphysical primary, because that which IS all things, the primary, nullifies that which is in opposition to it–in this case, a “plurality of existence according to nature”–which attempts to subordinate existence, the metaphysical primary, to nature, in order to rationalize a plurality of existence. This is obviously contradictory, and thus illogical and impossible.

Nature, then, cannot be the one thing which all things equally share, but also by which objects can be defined distinctly, because this is a contradiction in terms. In short, nature cannot be rationally incorporated into the metaphysical primary of existence, which again must be singular, because it–that is nature–is considered a property unique and of various value or degree to objects. Since existence, the primary, must rationally apply to all objects equally, then by definition there can be no unique and ultimately distinctive properties amongst those objects.

In every case then, I submit, there can be no plurality of existence for the simple fact that there must be some singular and absolute commonality which binds all objects by forming the very essence from which they all are a direct function, and which resolves the existential mutual exclusivity of objects which are said to be “plurality” at the fundamental, primary metaphysical level really must mean mean is infinitely distinct…or infinite distinction. Which is of course impossible. For even what is “plural” in existence must have a common context whereby the plurality is not infinite distinction between objects–which again is really the metaphysic of the mutual exclusivity of objects–in order that actual efficacious interaction between and amongst objects can occur. And that context is the metaphysical primary. And it is not plural, but utterly and infinitely inclusive and singular.

Why a Plurality of Existence is Impossible

“Existence exists”, not distinct existences, so the metaphysical premise goes.

So, let’s be clear about what this means. It’s not the tree which is the metaphysical primary, okay, but the existence of the tree. And since existence is the primary, and all things “objectively” exist, existence becomes a de facto singularity, not a plurality, since there is and can be no relevant difference between the existence of objects. In other words, if all things exist, and existence is the metaphysical  primary, then all things must exist equally. It cannot be said that on the primary metaphysical level one thing–one object–exists more or less than another.  Meaning that when it comes to existence, there are no relevant distinctions between the existence of objects…between that which equally–in equal measure–applies to all objects, regardless of what the objects are; regardless of the nature of the objects. And an irrelevant distinction is in fact no distinction at all. For nature does not trump the metaphysical primary in terms of describing the absolute, infinite, unchanging essence of a thing. Nature thus becomes moot if in fact the metaphysical primary is one of absolute and infinite equality.

Additionally, it is not the nature of objects which drives the supreme relevancy of existence, as though it functions according to its own separate paradigm. For in that case the metaphysical primary would be absolutely bound to “nature”, making it a direct function of existence. But in that case, how can there be distinctions of nature? If nature is in essence the metaphysical primary, and thus must apply in full and equal measure–absolute and infinite–to all objects, then how can any relevant distinctions be defined by nature?

They cannot.

So then, for nature to apply as a means to provide relevant distinctions between objects it really cannot have anything directly to do with the metaphysical primary.  It must apply particularly to specific objects, in varying degrees, and not equal amongst objects. But this becomes impossible and irrelevant to that which does apply absolutely equally to all objects–that is, the metaphysical primary, because that which IS all things, the primary, nullifies that which is in opposition to it–in this case, a “plurality of existence according to nature”–which attempts to subordinate existence, the metaphysical primary, to nature, in order to rationalize a plurality of existence. This is obviously contradictory, and thus illogical and impossible.

Nature, then, cannot be the one thing which all things equally share, but also by which objects can be defined distinctly, because this is a contradiction in terms. In short, nature cannot be rationally incorporated into the metaphysical primary of existence, which again must be singular, because it–that is nature–is considered a property unique and of various value or degree to objects. Since existence, the primary, must rationally apply to all objects equally, then by definition there can be no unique and ultimately distinctive properties amongst those objects.

In every case then, I submit, there can be no plurality of existence for the simple fact that there must be some singular and absolute commonality which binds all objects by forming the very essence from which they all are a direct function, and which resolves the existential mutual exclusivity of objects which are said to be “plurality” at the fundamental, primary metaphysical level really must mean mean is infinitely distinct…or infinite distinction. Which is of course impossible. For even what is “plural” in existence must have a common context whereby the plurality is not infinite distinction between objects–which again is really the metaphysic of the mutual exclusivity of objects–in order that actual efficacious interaction between and amongst objects can occur. And that context is the metaphysical primary. And it is not plural, but utterly and infinitely inclusive and singular.