[Here is a reblog of my previous article, with significant additions and edits. ]
“Existence exists”, not distinct existences, so the metaphysical premise goes.
So, let’s be clear about what this means. It’s not the tree which is the metaphysical primary, okay, but the existence of the tree. And since existence is the primary, and all things “objectively” exist, existence becomes a de facto singularity, not a plurality, since there is and can be no relevant difference between the existence of objects. In other words, if all things exist, and existence is the metaphysical primary, then all things must exist equally. It cannot be said that on the primary metaphysical level one thing–one object–exists more or less than another. Meaning that when it comes to existence, there are no relevant distinctions between the existence of objects…between that which equally–in equal measure–applies to all objects, regardless of what the objects are; regardless of the nature of the objects. And an irrelevant distinction is in fact no distinction at all. For nature does not trump the metaphysical primary in terms of describing the absolute, infinite, unchanging essence of a thing. Nature thus becomes moot if in fact the metaphysical primary is one of absolute and infinite equality.
Additionally, it is not the nature of objects which drives the supreme relevancy of existence, as though it functions according to its own separate paradigm. For in that case the metaphysical primary would be absolutely bound to “nature”, making it a direct function of existence. But in that case, how can there be distinctions of nature? If nature is in essence the metaphysical primary, and thus must apply in full and equal measure–absolute and infinite–to all objects, then how can any relevant distinctions be defined by nature?
So then, for nature to apply as a means to provide relevant distinctions between objects it really cannot have anything directly to do with the metaphysical primary. It must apply particularly to specific objects, in varying degrees, and not equal amongst objects. But this becomes impossible and irrelevant to that which does apply absolutely equally to all objects–that is, the metaphysical primary, because that which IS all things, the primary, nullifies that which is in opposition to it–in this case, a “plurality of existence according to nature”–which attempts to subordinate existence, the metaphysical primary, to nature, in order to rationalize a plurality of existence. This is obviously contradictory, and thus illogical and impossible.
Nature, then, cannot be the one thing which all things equally share, but also by which objects can be defined distinctly, because this is a contradiction in terms. In short, nature cannot be rationally incorporated into the metaphysical primary of existence, which again must be singular, because it–that is nature–is considered a property unique and of various value or degree to objects. Since existence, the primary, must rationally apply to all objects equally, then by definition there can be no unique and ultimately distinctive properties amongst those objects.
In every case then, I submit, there can be no plurality of existence for the simple fact that there must be some singular and absolute commonality which binds all objects by forming the very essence from which they all are a direct function, and which resolves the existential mutual exclusivity of objects which are said to be “plurality” at the fundamental, primary metaphysical level really must mean mean is infinitely distinct…or infinite distinction. Which is of course impossible. For even what is “plural” in existence must have a common context whereby the plurality is not infinite distinction between objects–which again is really the metaphysic of the mutual exclusivity of objects–in order that actual efficacious interaction between and amongst objects can occur. And that context is the metaphysical primary. And it is not plural, but utterly and infinitely inclusive and singular.