I posit this:
Physical law is a cognitive organizational construct; it is conceptual in the purest abstract sense of the word. It possesses no material characteristics; it cannot directly interact with material, empirical reality, but only indirectly as a means by which man conceptually organizes his environment. It therefore has no determinative power to exercise over material, empirical reality.
The assertion that physical law exists outside of the human mind, and possesses utterly non-abstract existent properties, and is thus discovered and observed, and is in essence something empirical, and is of the environment, not of the mind, presents with a number of rationally irreconcilable propositions. Here are just a few:
If physical law determines the actions (and reactions) of objects, what then determines physical law? Physical law is the determinative force. Whatever action it takes in order to effect the inevitable determined object outcome must take place. But if we say that the actions of physical law are not themselves determined then we are saying that those actions do not not necessarily need to take place. Therefore, the object outcome which physical law governs likewise does not necessary need to take place, and thus is not necessarily inevitable, and thus is not necessarily determined. A determinative force, like physical law, would require a determinative force to govern its actions…and so on and so forth…a perpetual regression. Therefore, physical law cannot be determinative, and therefore is not law.
That physical law governs objects presumes a distinction between physical law and those objects. If this is the case, then can we not say that it is the properties of the objects themselves which dictate their behavior and not physical law? But if we argue that these properties are themselves a function of physical law, how can it be said that there is an actual distinction between physical law and the objects it governs? There could be no distinction. Without a distinction there can be nothing for physical law to govern and therefore physical law is not actually law.
If the observer is a direct function of physical law then how can he observe it from a distinct frame of reference…a reference which is required in order that observation can actually occur? If there is no such frame of reference, and thus no observation, and thus no observer, then who or what defines physical law as being, in fact, physical law? If there exists no one to declare a thing a thing then to whom or what is that thing relevant? There is no one and nothing. Without relevancy there is no purpose, and if there is no purpose there is no meaning, and without meaning there is no definition, and without definition nothing can be said to exist. If what exists cannot be defined, how can it be said to exist? “What exists?” is a question with no possible answer.
Physical law taken beyond man’s mind is a rational disaster.