Category Archives: General Philosophy

An Argument to Consider: “Punishment” Serves No Practical Purpose; it is Violence for the Sake of Violence; it is Not Justice, nor is it Habilitative or Rehabilitative or Redemptive

General Philosophy, ,

* [Please note that the following is NOT an argument which can, in its present form, be applied to criminal justice systems as a function of the State; nor is this my intention with this article. The following argument as is, is a philosophical one. Also please note that in this article I briefly discuss the “irrational man”; however I will not cover the particulars of “willful irrationality”. For that is a topic for another article. But I do wish it to be understood that I am not suggesting that an irrational man is somehow absolved of his responsibility to reason; that he somehow cannot help his logically flawed thinking.  Though this may be true on a psychological or neurological level in some instances, the majority of those who think and act irrationally do so, I submit, of their own unfettered will.]

Consider:

Punishment serves no practical purpose.  And because it therefore serves no practical purpose it serves no rational purpose. And because it serves no rational purpose, it serves no moral purpose. In which case, punishment is merely meaningless violence.

Being violence, then, and absent any relevant efficacy, punishment is merely the infliction of injury and pain for its own sake; that is, violence for no other reason than to be violent; violence for violence’s sake, period. And in this way, punishment is more synonymous with revenge, as revenge serves no reconciliatory nor rehabilitative purpose whatsoever, by definition.

But one may object to such a description and evaluation of punishment on the basis that punishment is a necessary and logical consequence of violating a given ethical standard (upon which legal codes are based). Thus, the idea commonly assumed is that punishment is a means of redressing an act of ethical trespass.

This begs the question(s): What is the moral reference for the ethical standard? What precisely is it which the ethical standard seeks to affirm as Good and protect as Sactosanct? Certainly the ethical standard cannot be, itself, the moral reference; for this is a contradiction, and eliminates any practical value the ethical standard might hold for anything–or anyone, to be precise–outside of it.

Now, let’s take a moment to carefully discuss the idea of an ethical standard (e.g. “the law”) as its own moral reference, because understanding the logical failure of this idea is extremely important. Even today there are many people who believe that human beings follow laws, whatever and wherever they may be (religion, society, or other cooperatives) for the sake of laws, which always marginalizes humanity, eventually leading to its destruction.

For example, if an ethical standard says that thou shalt do X because X is good for the ethical standard–that is, doing X is good because the standard (the Law) is good (again, the ethical standard as its own moral reference)–we find ourselves faced with two insurmountable rational flaws (the latter proceeding from the former):

  1. Doing X is good for the ethical standard, which dictates the doing of X solely because doing X is good for the standard, which, being the moral reference, is already good, even in the absence of doing X. Put more simply, doing X is good for the standard, which as the moral reference is already good, and yet it still commands the doing of X.  Do you see the redundancy? One does X in order to affirm the command (the standard…the “law”) to do X, which is already good even absent the actual doing of X (the actual following of/obedience to the command), making the doing of X morally and practically irrelevant. Further, there is no relevant difference between the doing of X and the command to do X. It goes something like this: One is commanded to do X, which one does soley to affirm the command, because it is its own moral reference, and the command says to do X, which one does soley to affirm the command, because it is its own moral reference, and the command says to do X, which one does…and so on and so forth. Doing X then = the command to do X (the standard, the law). So X, the act = X, the command. The command, bring its own moral reference, is utterly in service to itself. There is thus no practical way to apply the ethical standard for any rational or moral purpose other than to simply repeat the command of the standard. Which is to say that there is no rational or moral purpose of the ethical standard at all.
  2. The circular nature and redundancy of such a dichotomy (the ethical standard equaling the moral reference) cancels out the standard, rendering it completely obsolete to the volitional agent (man).  Or, on the other hand, one could argue that the ethical standard, being circular whereby it infinitely folds back on itself, is absolute, and thus nullifies any awareness of one’s own individual, autonomous existence, because such an awareness of such existence contradicts the absolute (infinite) nature of the ethical standard which is also its own moral reference. Which is to say that man is rendered completely obsolete by the ethical standard. In either case, whether the ethical standard is rendered obsolete or man is, man and the ethical standard (when it is its own moral reference) are mutually exclusive.

*

So, it is impossible for man to appeal to the ethical standard as its own moral reference, because by becoming its own moral reference it utterly excludes itself from the frame of reference of the human individual (his Self) who thus cannot then appeal to it in any measure at all, nullifying all arguments that the ethical standard is its own moral reference. 

So then, if the ethical standard cannot be its own moral reference, what is the moral reference?

I submit that the only rational moral reference (that to which it answers and which it affirms) is the volitional agent; whose volitional and self-aware existence gives it any meaning at all. And by “volitional agent” I mean: the human individual. The affirmation of the goodness of the individual and the promotion of his right to own and pursue his singular existence is the sole purpose of any ethical standard.

Thus, the ethical standard has no actual value in and of itself.  It only has value in that it affirms and promotes people.

Okay, but what does this have to do with punishment?

Well, there is nothing of punishment then which can be rationally implied or intended by the standard. You cannot punish someone for violating an ethical, and by extension, legal, standard which has no moral value in and of itself. Because the moral reference, not the ethical standard, is what is actually violated.

Now, here’s the crux.

Therefore, the ethical standard is established not to punish the unrighteous individual, but to protect and promote the righteous one. Not to punish the guilty, but to protect and promote the innocent.

But, one may be inclined to ask, if righteous and innocent people are what is actually violated, cannot the unrighteous and guilty be punished for their violations?

The answer is no, and the problem is punishment qua punishment.

You see, individuals, being the moral reference for ethical standards, are not affirmed through punishment, but through promotion and protection (ostensibly through the establishment of the ethical standard–the law). Punishment, which is applied following a violation, does neither.  For only two things fundamentally promote and protect human individuals, the moral reference: reason and restraint. (“Restraint”, as in the neutralization of those who violate others. And by “neutralization” I don’t necessarily mean “death”, but a neutralization of their ability to threaten individuals by some manner of restraint, which can mean death, but not necessarily so.) Neither of these things has anything to do with punishment.

Let me explain.

The rational man who has by some means violated the ethical standard–which is to say, violated his fellow man–and in doing so become unjust (the “rational unjust”) can be shown by reason his error; and will, being rational, concede it, rendering punishment of no use. You see, his obedience to reason is the affirmation and refuge of the innocent, and the validation of the efficacy and truth of the ethical standard, and its moral reference, the individual. The innocent and the just are protected by reason, not punishment. To punish the man who has conceded the evil of his actions serves no purpose other than to torment him; to violate him, making hypocrites out of those who dole out punishment in service to “justice”.

Now, the irrational man who has violated the ethical standard and thus its moral reference cannot (or will not, which, practically speaking, is the same thing) be receptive to reason–to rationally consistent arguments–and thus cannot concede it, which also renders punishment moot. For the irrational man cannot apprehend the point of, or the justification for, punishment, because any such point or justification, to be moral, reasonable,  and non-hypocritical, would need to serve a purpose, and a purpose demands a rational explication which the irrational man cannot concede. Which again means that the innocent and the just are not protected by punishment. Nor are they, in this instance, protected, obviously, by reason. For the unrighteous irrational man who has acted unjustly cannot, again by definition, be reasoned with, and therefore there is no point in punishing him; for punishment can serve no rehabilitative, habilitative, or reconciliatory purpose, since the irrational man cannot apprehend the reason for the punishment in the first place. The innocent and the righteous must therefore be protected from the unrighteous irrational man via the restraining of the unrighteous irrational man’s ability to violate individuals.

And this restraining of irrational, unrighteous, immoral men who violate the ethical standard–which means to violate the moral reference, which means to violate individual human beings–is not punishment, but prevention.

Collectivism and the Corollary Between Wealth and Power

General Philosophy, Metaphysics, , , ,

I define Collectivism this way:

Collectivism is–when we follow the breadcrumbs back to the logical premise–the collectivist metaphysic. And the collectivist metaphysic is this: that human existence and identity is not a function of one’s individual self, that is, one’s own ability to create a cognitive conceptual distinction between one’s singular conscious Self, and Other/Environment (or, That Which is Not Self); but rather, existence is function of some manner of group affiliation based upon a group Identity, and the necessarilry underlying deterministic processes which such existence and identity demands.

For example, according to what I term “racial Marxism”, one is considered first and foremost a product of his or her racial category. Like,for example, “white” or “black”. Therefore, the root of the individual Self is found in the ontological primary–or, better termed, the “collectivist Ideal”– of “Blackness” or “Whiteness”, and this Ideal is in turn practically and pragmatically defined and represented by some “Authority” who must claim themselves–or himself or herself–the incarnate representation of the Ideal.

Individual Self, then, is always subordinated to the collective of “black people”, or “white people”, as defined and exemplified by the Authority–they, or he or she, who represents the Ideal, and physically manifests it, to the group.  And since the individual is of course born into their “Whiteness” or “Blackness”, the individual himself or herself having no choice in the matter, he or she is wholly determined by the processes which have dictated his or her race; and these processes are always at least tacitly ascribed to the Ideal. For what can ultimately determine race except the Ideal which grants race its efficacy and meaning?

Thus, one’s sense of individual Self, according to the collectivist paradigm, can only be an abberation–an affront to the natural, deterministic order of things. In other words, a sense of individual, autonomous Self, is, in fact, an act of existential treason, and must therefore be destroyed by force, not by choice, since in man’s “fallen” state, which is his “natural” context of Self, he is beer we reality from this perversion of existence…this abomination…this endemic and categorical depravity.  And by “force” I mean not only violence, but intellectual larceny–artifice, propaganda, lies, appeals to emotions over reason.

*

I submit that in collectivism, because of its  reliance on Authority for its practical manifestation (enforcement), power must constantly be dispatched, and this always for the sole purpose of acquiring wealth–or “resources”–at the expense of others. That is, power exercised from a collectivist premise is solely a power meant to commandeer; it is never a legitimate–that is, voluntary–exchange of value, regardless of the context (the specific collectivist Ideal in question). You see, collectivist power does not earn. It takes.

Now, I should pause here, in the interest of rational consistency. Above I just referred to “collectivist power”, however, I submit that this is a redundant expression. The exercise of power over others always implies a collectivist premise; a collectivist Ideal. There is no way to compel by force the behavior of another human being if we in fact concede that each one possesses a metsphysical context of singular Self whereby they alone are in the position of ultimately determining their own desires (needs and wants) from this absolute context; that is, the context of individual Self.

Put simply, to use power to compel behavior is to assume that the individual is existentially insufficient, and therefore he or she must be compelled from “outside” themselves, by one or some who claim the authority to exist for them, according to some “transcendent” enlightenment (revelation; awakening), which is always a function of some omnipotent, ethereal  “creator” or determining force, which is collectivist Ideal–like “Blackness” or “Whiteness”, for example.

Henceforth, then, I will not speak of collectivist power, but simply “power”, since I submit that all power–the use of force to compel others–necessarily proceeds from a collectivist metaphysic.

2.

Relationships which in incorporate exercises of power by one or some over others are never, and can never be, mutually beneficial. One is always affirmed and expanded, while the other is always sacrificed.

In other words, the exercise of power is always intended to commandeer wealth, never to earn it; and this power is always morally and intellectually underwritten by an appeal to Authority.

Now, the corollary relationship between wealth and power is built upon this Authority. For Authority is an appeal to some absolute mandate from the transcendent, cosmic Ideal to use power to compel sacrifice (of wealth, which includes Self). Authority, then, in a sense, IS power; and power is force, and force is always applied to elicit sacrifice.

So what is sacrifice, beyond the surrendering of self and wealth? Sacrific, within the collectivist framework, is the absolute moral and intellectual obligation of he or she who is to be sacrifice; which makes true then that compelling sacrifice through power is the absolute moral and intellectual obligation of he or she who is in authority.

So, what is the exercise of Authority again? The use of power, which is force. And why power? To commandeer wealth (resources); which is the practical, visceral, and inexorable consequence of increasing the scope of Authority as a function of the transcendent, collectivist Ideal’s absolute mandate to compel absolute sacrifice to that Ideal.

*

Authority is the use of power according to an Ideal’s mandate to compel sacrifice; but it is also an epistemology and an ethic–that is, it is an intellectual and moral appeal to the “truth” of the collectivist Ideal.

The Ideal itself must be rooted in Authority, you see, because it cannot be described by rational explication since it is by definition beyond the epistemological and ethical frame of reference of individuals. And this is why ideological “truth” is always a function of ” revelation”, where revelation is defined as the transcendent (or “supernatural”) dispensing of unknowable knowledge.

Since authority, then, is the moral and intellectual appeal to the “truth” of the collectivist Ideal for the exercise of power in order to commandeer wealth, we are relationally–or “politically”, in philosophical parlance–going to observe what I call an “authority/submission dynamic”.

The authority/submission dynamic in turn implies the following practical politic also dynamic with respect to wealth (resources):

Absolute gain/Absolute loss

The salient term is, of course, “absolute”; for once we concede Authority as the intellectual and moral political premise, power must be absolutely applied in order to compel people and wealth absolutely into the collectivist Ideal. The Ideal of which is, again, incarnate in the Authority, which has been specially (transcendently) “called” to compel sacrifice.

The Authority has a divine mandate to use power to compel individual sacrifice because it is necessary to compel behavior, since human beings from their “natural”, and “fallen” or “insufficient” individual frame of reference cannot choose to obey, being wholly outside the collectivist metaphysic, as specified by the particular Ideal in question. In other words, since the human being is cognitively/consciously an individual (all of us naturally employ the pronoun “I”), he or she cannot obey on his or her own. He or she cannot, by “nature”, see beyond the absolute frame of reference of his or her individual awareness/consciousness. Thus, he or cannot choose to obey; he or she must ultimately be forced.

So, when we speak of collectivism, Authority is necessary to force the surrendering of individual wealth. If Authority is not necessary, then there is no rational argument for any kind or measure of authority in the first place. To say Authority is optional is to metaphysically concede that the individual possesses the innate ability to apprehend truth from the frame reference of individual Self, and thus can independently choose to act in a manner consistent with truth, and truth’s corollary, morality. In which case, compelling behavior by force must then violate truth and morality at the most fundamental level–the metaphysical. And this completely repudiates the collectivist Metaphysic and Ideal, full stop.

Therefore, authority conceded in any measure, I submit, must inevitably be applied absolutely. And absolute authority applied is the application of absolute power. And absolute power seeks to acquire absolute wearth.

So, authority/submission = absolute gain (for the authority)/absolute loss (for those under authority). In ratio form, this relationship looks like this:

1:0

The ratio represents the notion that the collectivist Ideal, which is absolute, and established by its Authority, is the only legitimate thing which has a right to exist. Since it alone possesses “truth” (being “truth” itself), and is the absolute source then of the truth–the “real” reality– of all things, anything which assumes, or appears to possess, an independent existence must be sacrificed. And nowhere is such an independent existence more apparent than in the individual human being–he and she who has the evil temerity to use the pronoun “I”.

Think of this like “God” in the erroneous orthodox Christian sense, where God is the direct and utterly controlling, determining and determinist source of all things–all which exists and acts. If God is and acts for everything, then what does that make everything?

It makes everything God.

God is all, and thus all is not actually all at all, but all is nothing. And hence the ratio: 1:0.

But here’s the thing, and you probably see where this is going. Since God = the essence, will, and action of all things and all persons, what we really have is not that God = everything, but that God = God. Or:

1:1

Which is really:

1

Therefore any individual who claims a distinct existence, and by that distinct existence a distinct identity, and by that distinct identity a distinct volition, must be forcefully sacrificed, and abeolute my so. They must be compelled into oblivion by the absolute seizure of their wealth (which includes their very selves— the source of all their labor) so that that which is the 1 is truly and pragmatically and effectively the only ONE.

3.

Authority as a function of the collectivist Ideal demands absolute sacrifice, and it compels this sacrifice by exercising absolute power, and this in order to subordinate all things and all persons to itself; the practical manifestation of this being the commandeering of resources to the point where no one else– no individual–has the means to pursue or manifest or display their own unique existence in any relevant or substantive measure whatsoever.

Authority, to put it directly, is the violent seizure and consumption of resources to an absolute degree in service to a given collectivist Ideal. Nothing outside of this Ideal–or, functionally speaking, the Authority which enforces it upon individuals–is considered to possess a legitimate existence. Thus, anything– or, more importantly, anyone–outside of the collectivist Ideal, which by definition includes all individuals, will be sacrificed. It (anything) and they (anyone) will be rendered the ZERO so that the Ideal can be the ONE.

And thus we are brought back to the claim which is the title of this  article:

Wealth and power are necessary corollaries when a function of a collectivist metaphysic; specifically defined as a given collectivist Ideal. An increase in one necessitates an increase in the other, and this by subordinating all wealth–all life, property, labor, currency, and capital–to an established Authority, which creates thus the authority/submission political dynamic, which in turn renders the existential ratio of the Authority to its subordinates (as the authority is the practical incarnation of the Ideal) as 1:0; which functionally equals 1, where 1 is the Authority, which claims to act in service to the Ideal– this Ideal being the infinite, transcendent, cosmic Cause and Inexorable Determining Will of all things, and on the behalf of which all things are sacrificed by Authoritative power.

In short, Collectivism will inevitably and necessarily manifest the exercise of absolute power in order to acquire absolute wealth; one necessarily amounting to the other.

4.

Within the framework of collectivism, an increase in power necessarily results in a commensurate increase in wealth, and vice versa; for wealth and power are corollaries because the collective Ideal necessarily assumes them both, and, ultimately, absolutely.  The point then, or the unavoidable consequence, you could say, of wealth is power; and the point, or unavoidable consequence, of power is wealth.

Both find their intellectual and moral foundation in Authority, which in turn creates the requisite political dynamic of authority/submission. And what the Authority demands, both intellectually and morally, is that all things, including and especially individual human beings, must be forcibly (violently, or through manipulation, which is a form of violence) compelled into absolute sacrifice, and this because human beings naturally and endemically observe existence from the frame of reference of a distinct, autonomous, and singular Self, which is by definition an intellectual anathema and a moral offense to the collectivist Ideal.

The collective, or group, Identity is rooted in the collectivist Ideal, which is the transcendent Cause and Essence and Will of all things which divinely mandates the Authority–a human being or group of human beings who serve as the incarnate (i.e. material/practical) manifestation of the Ideal–to assume and use absolute power to acquire absolute wealth (persons, property, labor, currency, etc.) in order to functionally establish the assumption that the Ideal is the only thing which may exist; because it alone, not the individual nor any other thing in creation, is absolute.

A specific collectivist Ideal can be almost anything. A few examples are:

•A deity or deities

•A religious denomination, or sect, or the “Church”

•Culturally or socially-based collectives like the Tribe, the Family, the the Nation, or Tradition

•Sub cultural or political groups like the Gang, the Club, the Party, the Association, the Team, the Brotherhood, the Union, the Workers

•Natural “law”, like the Laws of Physics, genetic or biological determinative attributes like race, gender, and even IQ depending on who you ask, evolutionary “forces”, and other physical, biological, and/or physiological processes.

 

 

 

 

 

Why Voting is Not in One’s Self Interest

General Philosophy, Metaphysics, , , ,

[Updated version of “Why Voting Out of Self Interest is a Contradiction in Terms”; with many edits]

Staying with the theme of voting, and my devil’s advocate approach (again because I do not consider myself an anarchist), here is another article criticizing the efficacy and rationality of voting. In this article, I take a much more denunciatory approach, questioning not merely the relevancy of voting–specifically for public officials in a representative democracy–but the morality of it. I l attempt to effectively argue why voting is a fundamental denial of one’s own self, and a capitulation to rule that must inevitably lead to one’s own categorical destruction.

Perhaps this is hyperbole. Judge for yourself. And feel free to disagree and comment. I am very interested in your perspectives on this controversial topic.

1.

Voting, I submit, is a contradiction to self, and a rank opponent of self-interest, and therefore an opponent of self-existence. And this is because, I aver, voting always implies an authority/submission dynamic–henceforth referred to as a “politic”. That is, to vote for someone to occupy a specific office implies that that office is one in which appealing to authority–which means appealing to force–is the fundamental means of discharging the duties of that office. This in turn nullifies the nominal purpose of voting (the affirmation of the self via representation) and therefore demands that all representative democracies inevitably morph into tyrannies sooner or later. Usually sooner.

But before we can discuss the conclusion, naturally we must examine the rationale that I submit takes us there.

2.

When it comes to claims that voting is not in the self-interest of the voter, the most obvious and perhaps most stark evidentiary argument can be found with those who voted for the loser of an election: the minority vote.  Indeed, it seems almost a poor use of time explicating the reasons why voting is not in the interest of those voters on the losing side of the election. Nevertheless, the self-evidentiary nature of such reasons may not be so…well, self-evident, given the common assumptions with respect to the presumed benevolence of a representative democracy. So let’s go ahead and examine the reasons.

The assertion:

The voting process whereby the majority elects the one who will act (ostensibly) as a representative of the “people” means that the self-interest of the minority–those who did not cast votes for the representative elected–is not served by the vote. Keeping in mind that “self-interest” is defined by the individual, not the representative nor the collective which he or she  ostensibly serves. For only the individual has the absolute context of “self” whereby self can be sufficiently known in order to ultimately determine what it truly needs and desires.

By definition, then, and ironically, the representative, or official, who has been elected to represent the minority has neither been elected by them, nor can he or she represent them, since such an official, during his or her running for office, must have openly declared that what they support and affirm with respect to the purpose and plans of that office is contrary to what the minority voters desired. In which case the official must necessarily officiate his or her responsibilities in a manner contrary to the will of certain people–people who are nevertheless obligated to submit to the authority given to the official by other voters who are not their political allies, and who may even promote ideas which are diametrically opposite.

Now, one might be tempted to make the argument that, given certain constitutional dictates, or the freedom to move out of the given geopolitical area, the minority voter is not necessarily bound to an elected official’s authority. But I submit that this reveals a lack of true understanding of the root philosophical premises and implications which underwrite the idea of voting…premises and implications one necessarily  concedes by engaging in the voting process in the first place.. These premises (which we will discuss momentarily) and implications have consequences which must inevitably reach across all geopolitical boundaries and eventually affect the whole of humanity, and define its condition.

But at the very least, to argue that one who finds himself or herself under the authority of an official they did not consign to office is not necessarily obligated to submit to that official’s authority, is to render their vote, as well as the  voting process irrelevant entirely, thus supporting my case that voting cannot in fact serve their self-interest.

My point here is that there is no reason to vote for someone who shall have no power over the voter to affect outcomes; who shall possess no philosophical mandate to exert some manner of control–of force.  And even more concisely: to vote is to implicitly condone rank authority over one’s life via the power granted by the vote to he or she who has been elected–as a function of their office. Period. In other words, voting does not imply freedom from coercive force by authority, but affirms it. If authority is not granted by the vote, then I submit what one is doing is not voting, and that voting is moot.

But some may argue that voting is voluntary. Thus, voting is not a binding of oneself inexorably to authority, but rather an exercise of free will.

I would counter this claim by saying that authority and free will are mutually exclusive. That if we accept that the vote implies the authority of the elected official to act, then free will is non-applicable to the process. Indeed, this is almost my entire point of this article: that free will in the case of democratic voting is in fact an illusion. Perhaps a convincing illusion due to the deft nature of the sophist arguments in support of voting, but an illusion nonetheless.

In other words, I submit that it is a contradiction, and thus impossible, to bind oneself willingly to authority, since authority is the power to compel behavior by force (if there is no  implicit force there is no explicit authority). Once force…once threats of punishment or death enter the equation, free will is irrelevant.  For choosing to obey or to be shot/imprisoned  (or otherwise punished) is NOT a legitimate choice.

But to willingly and freely accept the requests of another in one’s own self-interest is to fundamentally grant allegiance first and foremost to one’s own self-interest. And one never to votes for one’s own interest. It is what one does by nature. Thus, such a relationship is not and cannot be dependent on a vote, but on volunteerism. And volunteerism is obviously not efficacious by authority, but by cooperation. That is, it is not a relationship based upon an authority/submission politic, but on the voluntary mutual exchange of value.

Where there is no authority there is no force. And where there is no force there is no sacrifice of ANY individuals. And where there is no sacrifice of any individuals (like the minority voter) there is no efficacy not purpose of voting. For if those elected to office NEVER have the power to compel behavior by force,  then it does not matter who is elected to office, or if anyone is. People are free to cooperate with those they like, and to eschew cooperation with those they do not. Since officials have no authority over any person, any person’s vote for them is irrelevant. Any person can choose to interact with them in whatever capacity they want, or not. And thus if voting doesn’t imply a right to rule–to compel–then what exactly is the point of voting?

Or said another way, of what use is voting for someone with whom you will only ever engage cooperatively–that is, of your own will and according to your own interest?

None at all.

Therefore I argue that when one votes he or she must implicitly accept the idea that submission to authority is the efficacious and rational means of effecting outcomes as a function of the relationship one has with his or her elected official. And this context, I submit, must inevitably expand to includes one’s very existence, in general. He or she who refuses to submit themselves, and their very will, to he or she who has been elected by the majority vote, acts hypocritically with respect to voting, thus nullifying the voting process altogether, and their own identity of SELF (more on this in a moment) because they have refused the necessary authority/submission politic which they must have implicitly conceded as the fundamental philosophical rationale for casting their vote in the first place; and this in order to not render the act of voting an act of hypocrisy.

One cannot have his or her cake and eat it too. If one affirms the efficacy and morality of voting, by voting, then one is ethically obligated to the outcome of that vote, whatever it is, whomever is elected. What one wants, or believes is the moral or rational means to organize society one’s own life, or whatever other issue with which they happen to concern themselves, besides the point. One alaways votes not for cooperation, but for rule. One votes for a politic which demands that cooperation is fundamentally irrelevant. To vote is to submit, and this by the very nature of voting. And this concession to one’s individual submission is the irony which makes voting moot.

One could also put it this way: If the vote necessarily nullifies the free will of the minority voters by subjecting them to the coercive power–the authority–of the official, then I submit that everyone’s free will is nullified. That is, even what those who voted for the official want is besides the point. It may appear to be cooperation at first glance, but if force can be used to compel the will of those who voted against the official, then we must assume that force is the operative means by which everyone is compelled.

If one agrees with the official, good for them, they are not ostensibly forced. But at any time should that person withdraw his or her support, he or she shall be forced to comply with the authority granted by the vote, just like any other minority voter who must endure the consequences of the vote. And this makes the person’s willful compliance irrelevant. The official doesn’t need their will. He or she doesn’t need their choice. And thus, he or she doesn’t actually need their vote. In which case, force, then, not cooperation, is the operative root behind the actions of the elected official. Which again demands that voting is not really relevant at all, but is actually a metaphysical declaration that at one’s root, will, and therefore consciousness itself, shall be rendered moot, and that one must be compelled by force alone to outcomes desired by the authority.

3.

If social outcomes–if the social organization of human reality is a matter of who may compel the behavior of others by force, and this the premise behind voting, then voting is irrelevant. Voting for someone is irrelevant. Who rules is irrelevant. Authority–not ideas, not people, not cooperation–is the method of organizing human existence, in which case authority is the foundation of reality. The context of the individual–of self-awareness, free will and choice–is an anathema to the authority/submission politic. The life of the individual ceases to be the context. The frame of reference of the individual is not the yardstick of morality, conceptual efficacy, and truth. Rather, death, the absence of such a context, the absence of such a frame of reference, the absence of self becomes the measurement by which a moral and true society–that is, reality–is gauged.  And yet it doesn’t take an Aristotle to spot the implicit contradiction and predict the inevitable disaster.

4.

And so, even though I began this article by using the minority vote as an example of how voting itself undermines and contradicts its own meaning, relevancy, and purpose, I think I have illustrated how, because of the authority/submission politic necessarily demanded by voting and the self-denial that authority must command to be consistent with its premises, no one actually gains by conceding and instituting the vote as the means of establishing social, political, and economic structure. Further, I think that I have established that no one is ever, nor can they be, actually represented by he or she who is voted into office, because what one thinks, from the frame of reference of oneself, which is their only frame of reference, is irrelevant. And that to vote, whatever the outcome, is to concede that one–the individual–does not actually possess the metaphysical ability–that is, that natural ability–to apprehend reality and existence enough cast a vote in the first place. For to vote for someone to represent you is to concede that someone else must, and is able, to be you, for you. In which case, of what relevancy are you?

None at all.

If you can somehow exist and shall exist and manifest your own life by proxy, then there is no relevant context for you qua you. Which makes you–the root “is” that is you–of zero value. You qua you are actually a stumbling block to reality, and a hole in your own existence.

5.

To vote is not to cooperate. Cooperation nullifies the relevancy of voting because cooperation affirms the infinite value of every individual, which then denies the authority/submission politic implicit to voting. There are no losers in cooperative exchange. There are no “minority” participants, no “lesser” contributors. No one is collectivized in this a way, or in any way.  There is no sacrifice of “minority” participants to authority by election, only everyone’s fundamental self-interest.

Further, cooperation implies the freedom of individuals to not cooperate, and freedom from punitive measures as a consequence of non-cooperation, because the innate metaphysical value of the individual, even absent his or her cooperation, is still affirmed and established as the moral and rational standard.

But there is no freedom to opt out of the outcomes of a vote once one has cast it. Because at the heart of voting is, again, the idea that an individual can be represented. And the idea of representation bespeaks of a metaphysical premise which says that the individual is somehow able to exist by proxy. And to deny the outcome of the vote, to not submit, is to deny the premise. And therefore to deny he or she who was elected to represent oneself is tantamount to self–denial. And those who deny self are walking contradictions, and can expect to have no say in anything at all because they have forsaken themselves, which is: the authority of the official in power because of the vote, which they have conceded and to which they have agreed to submit by casting a vote in the first place. Those people should expect nothing but to be considered and treated as as enemies of a society and reality founded upon the authority/submission politic via the vote.

6.

In conclusion, I submit that voting and cooperation are mutually exclusive because they imply utterly opposing metaphysical premises with respect to those individuals governed by the outcomes of elections. To vote is to assume that one may be represented by another who is absolutely outside oneself, which is an impossible contradiction. But there is no such representation in cooperation. To cooperate, everyone must represent themselves, and all of us must recognize the infinite worth of one other, as individuals.

But as always, judge for yourselves the veracity of my arguments. I am open to all ideas.